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Re: Changing how we handle non-free firmware



On 9/4/22 14:38, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
I'm not sure that a GR should say what the interpretation of a document
should be. I really prefer that the document is changed instead so that
it's more clear on what it says.

I agree with "prefer", but I can't bring myself to say "require [amendment]" or "prohibit interpretative GRs".

I think it's reasonable, at least in some cases, for a GR to make an interpretation. While amending the Foundation Document to make it more clear is ideal in many situations, I'm not willing to say that _all_ situations require that.

Let's say that we have an non-hypothetical question, "Is X allowed by Foundation Document Y?". By non-hypothetical, I mean this is a live issue for some people; the question needs an answer one way or another _and_ there is disagreement on the answer.

I think we can safely assume these sort of interpretive questions do come up in real life. For example, ftpmaster interpreting the DFSG seems like a common case. (Of course, most of the time those would not lead to GRs.)

Thus, a possible precursor to an interpretive GR is that some person/group (e.g. ftpmaster, Project Leader, TC, Secretary[1]) makes the interpretive decision.

If someone can make the decision, then they can be overruled[2][3] by the Developers through a GR. I don't think a blanket prohibition on Foundation Document-interpreting GRs makes sense in that context. It doesn't seem correct that Developers somehow lose their power to overrule if the issue involves interpretation of a Foundation Document.

One might argue that the Developers retain that power through an amending GR. But I argue that those are separate powers (from the explicit text of the constitution), with separate majority requirements, and for good reason. Amending a Foundation Document requires 3:1. It is thus possible for an amending GR to fail, even if it has ballot options to resolve the question each way. That is, if the issue is split and neither side is >= 3:1, "None of the Above" wins. This leaves the question undecided. The ambiguity still exists and the live issue still needs an answer. However, if we have an interpreting GR, then it can produce an answer (assuming it's a yes/no question and people on each side rank their answer above NOTA).

The Developers' powers to overrule also come with the power to make the decision in the first instance. So while overruling is one scenario, it is not the only scenario.

[1] I understand that your (the Secretary's) current position is that you do not have the power to interpret Foundation Documents. I contend that you implicitly do, at least insofar as such an interpretation is required to fulfill one of your explicit duties. If you do not, then it seems the Project Leader would, through a combination of 5.1.3 (requires urgent action) and/or 5.1.4 (noone else has responsibility).

But, at least in the U.S., there is a general rule of constitution interpretation: if there is a (I'd say _reasonable_) way to interpret something that does not make it unconstitutional, then those interpretations should be preferred over interpretations that make it unconstitutional.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/constitutional-doubt
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/constitutional_avoidance
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIII-S2-C1-9-7/ALDE_00013159/

This is why, while I would prefer that "where possible" be explicitly amended out by its Proposer, if that does not happen, I think it is better to interpret to implicitly strike that phrase rather than declaring the whole ballot option void.

Though, to be clear, if there is _no_ reasonable interpretation that makes a ballot option constitutional, then I still contend that the Secretary has the power _and duty_ to declare it unconstitutionally void.

[2] Overruling TC requires 2:1.

[3] Things get more complicated if the Secretary is doing the interpreting. We can game out how that plays out if the Developers collectively disagree with the Secretary, but fundamentally, if the Developers collectively disagree enough, they have the power to enforce their will (and technically only need 1:1, though politically it is more complicated).

--
Richard

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