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Re: Norman Petry and I (Ossipoff) recommended CSSD, but Schwartz Woodall is a better voting system for Debian

Quoted below, I'd suggested holding a 2nd Up/Down ratification vote on
the winner of an election between several mutually-competting
proposals to amend the consititution, and requireing it to get 3 time
more Yes votes than No votes in that 2nd vote, the Yes/No ratification

It occurs to me that, instead of holding a 2nd vote, the Yes/No vote,
one could instead just look at the rankings from the Schwartz Woodall
election to find out if the winner is ranked over D by 3 times more
ballots than rank D over it.

So the only purpose of D in the ranking would be 1) For treating it
like any other option, to find out if D wins; and 2) For finding out,
after the winner is found, if that eventual winner of the Schwartz
Woodlall count beats D by 3 to 1.

Below is quoted what I said in my previous post:

Of course a similar procedure could be used with CSSD too. And it
might make chicken dilemma defection not quite as easy, becauses the
only defection problem would be the one that is inherent in CSSD. But
of course that inherent CSSD chicken dilemma problem would remain, if
CSSD is used.

I was speaking instead of using, with Schwartz Woodall,  a 3:1
V(x,D)/V(D,x) requirement--_to be applied after (and if) some x wins_
to determine whether that winner passes the 3:1 supermajority
requirement--because we were discussing how the supermajority
requirement could be applied while still retaining Schwartz Woodall's
freedom from chicken dilemma.


But how about this?:  Instead of applying the 3:1 requirement before
 doing Schwartz Woodall, why not apply it _after_ the Schwartz Woodall
 count. Hold a 2nd Yes/No ratification vote, for the options that wins
 the Schwartz Woodall count. In that Yes/No vote, require that the
 option get 3 times more "Yes" votes than "No" votes in order to win.

 For constitutional amendments:

First, just do Schwartz Woodall., among the various options for
 amending the constitution. If D wins, then have more discussion, with
 another vote later.

If D doesn't win, then whatever option wins, for a constitutional
 amendment, hold a 2nd vote, a Yes/No vote on that amendment. The
 amendment passes only if it gets 3 times more "Yes" votes than "No"

In that way, the 3:1 supermajoriity requirement is preserved, without
 losing Schwartz Woodall's freedom from chicken dilemma.

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