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Re: Norman Petry and I (Ossipoff) recommended CSSD, but Schwartz Woodall is a better voting system for Debian

On Fri, May 10, 2013 at 04:40:37PM -0400, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> > So my understanding of things is that for your first 2 examples,
> > voters for B being dishonest resulted in C winning
> In CSSD, as defined in the Debian Constitution (and as I define it
> too), but disregarding the default alternative, D, and disregarding
> the local or per-option quota, R, B would win, by defection in all 3
> of my examples (when my first example is corrected to "100: C",
> instead of "3: C".

Going over them again, you had:
example 1:
- A defeats B by 99:2
- C defeats A by 100:99
- B defeats C by 101:100

If I read the constitution correctly, I need to drop the 1st
defeat, because V(A,B) = 99, and V(C, A) = 100, and 99 < 100,
so that's the weakest defeat, and B is the winner.

Example 2:
A defeats B by 33:32
C defeats A by 34:33
B defeats C by 65:34

And B would be the winner again.

I have to admit that I didn't correctly understand how things work
when it's not resolved by the transitive defeats.

> When I posted my examples, I didn't know about D or R.
> II understand that, before the CSSD count is done, any option X  that
> loses to D (more people rank D over X than X over D) is dropped. And,
> likewise, any option that isn't ranked over D by some specified
> number, R, of people is dropped.
> I want to add that I can't find any rule for choosing the numerical value of R.

The quorum (R) for most votes is "3Q" (4.2.4, 5.2.7) and Q depends
on the amount of DDs (4.2.7), and Q is normally somewhere around 15-16,
R being around 45-47.

> But at the end of your post, you said something to the effect that,
> when D is taken into account, where A>B>>C is (correctly, in my
> opinion) interpreted as A>B>D>C, then the defection works perfectly,
> and elects B every time, just as I said it would in my examples.

Yes, you have the same effect generated by the default option (D)
than we already had without it.

> We don't reallly disagree, then. We agree that, with the present
> system, the B voters' defection, in those examples, will elect B,
> stealing the election from A.
> Then that's why I propose that Schwartz Woodall would be a better
> voting system for Debian, because Schwarz Woodall doesn't have a
> chicken dilemma. That means that the Mutual Majority Criterion is
> fully in force. It means that a mutual majority truly have no need to
> do other than rank sincerely, to ensure that one of their
> mutual-majority-preferred options will win.   ...and they can achieve
> that even while freely choosing among their MM-preferred options, by
> ranking them sincerely.
> In CSSD, the chicken dilemma can spoil and disband a mutual majority.
> I recommend Schwartz Woodall for Debian voting.

I will try to read about this, I didn't have time for it so far.

I do understand that we have this chicken dilemma problem, but I'm
not convinced it's really a problem in Debian.


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