Re: Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote tallying
On Tue, 27 May 2003 10:18:18 -0400, Andrew Pimlott <email@example.com> said:
> ... and also more likely than if a plain Condorcet method were used.
> Which complicates the analysis, because it's easy to construct cases
> where B voters can beat A with strategy under both Condorcet+SSD and
> "approval+Condorcet+SSD". Here is a situation in which they are
sincere strategy by BAD
9 ABD 9 ABD
6 BAD 6 BDA
Hmm. What if I truly want to express the opinion that I like
A, and really and truly find B unacceptable, and thus express my
preference as BDA?
Why is this to be considered "strategic", as opposed to truly
expressing my preference? Why should the voting system be degraded to
refuse to allow me this expression of my belief?
I think I must be missing something major here (sorry:I've had
less than an average of 5 hours of sleep a night for the last 10 days
or so, and in my old age my faculties are failing me)
Captain Penny's Law: You can fool all of the people some of the time,
and some of the people all of the time, but you can't fool mom.
Manoj Srivastava <firstname.lastname@example.org> <http://www.debian.org/%7Esrivasta/>
1024R/C7261095 print CB D9 F4 12 68 07 E4 05 CC 2D 27 12 1D F5 E8 6E
1024D/BF24424C print 4966 F272 D093 B493 410B 924B 21BA DABB BF24 424C