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Re: Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote tallying

On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 02:50:55PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
> There is only one election. In this election, 38 voters prefer E to C,
> 42 voters prefer D to E and 24 voters prefer D to C. Manoj's May 15
> proposal would choose candidate E. My proposal would choose candidate D.
> But --and this is what I have to criticize-- _if there was a second election_
> then (simply because of the fact that in the first election the default
> option has been changed from candidate C to candidate E) in this second
> election the winner according to Manoj's May 15 proposal would be changed
> from candidate E to candidate D _without having any voter to change his
> mind_.

Um... I already addressed this (your response was "There is only one

I'm not sure how to talk about that hypothetical case if you're going
to be saying there is no such case.  How should I approach this issue
so that you can understand me?

> In my opinion, this is a disadvantage of Manoj's May 15 proposal because
> this means that Manoj's May 15 proposal leads to unnecessarily frequent
> changes of the status quo.

Given that elections failing on quorum are so rare, I don't see this as
a significant issue.  I'd be much more concerned about adopting (in those
rare circumstances) rules that not many people think were worth adopting.

The problem I have with your method is:  when people can't agree on
the which options are better than which other options, it's entirely
possible to pick an option which most everyone agrees to be worse
than doing nothing.  I see this as a significant potential problem in
situations where most people don't care to vote.

On the other hand, if you could show that the May 15 mechanism violates
monotonicity, then I'd be opposed to it.


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