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Re: Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote tallying



Hallo,

Situation 1:

   04 ABCDEF
   02 ABFDEC
   04 AEBFCD
   02 AEFBCD
   02 BFACDE
   02 CDBEFA
   04 CDBFEA
   12 DECABF
   08 ECDBFA
   10 FABCDE
   06 FABDEC
   04 FEDBCA

   A:B=40:20
   A:C=30:30
   A:D=30:30
   A:E=30:30
   A:F=24:36
   B:C=34:26
   B:D=30:30
   B:E=30:30
   B:F=38:22
   C:D=36:24
   C:E=22:38
   C:F=30:30
   D:E=42:18
   D:F=30:30
   E:F=32:28

   The winner is candidate A.

Situation 2:
  
   3 AEFCBD voters are added.
   
   A:B=43:20
   A:C=33:30
   A:D=33:30
   A:E=33:30
   A:F=27:36
   B:C=34:29
   B:D=33:30
   B:E=30:33
   B:F=38:25
   C:D=39:24
   C:E=22:41
   C:F=30:33
   D:E=42:21
   D:F=30:33
   E:F=35:28

   Now, the winner is candidate D.
   Thus the 3 AEFCBD voters change the
   winner from candidate A to candidate D.

******

John wrote (23 May 2003):
> instead, the per-option quorum will throw out the IDW in
> favour of a less-favoured option due to quorum requirements.
>
> R=15
> 10 ABD
>  5 BDA

I suggest that one should at first calculate the ranking of
the candidates according to the beat path method and then,
of those candidates whose beat path to the default option
meets the quorum, that candidate should be elected who is
ranked highest in the ranking of the beat path method.
That's the maximum that you can get without undermining
the intention of super-majority requirements.

In Situation 1, for example, the beat paths have the following
strengths:

   A:B=40:36
   A:C=34:32
   A:D=34:32
   A:E=34:32
   A:F=38:36
   B:C=34:32
   B:D=34:32
   B:E=34:32
   B:F=38:36
   C:D=36:38
   C:E=36:38
   C:F=32:34
   D:E=42:36
   D:F=32:34
   E:F=32:34

   Therefore, the ranking according to the beat path
   method is ABFDEC.

   Suppose that, for example, the default option is C
   and the quorum is 38. Then the winner is candidate D.

Markus Schulze (not Martin Schulze)



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