# Re: Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote tallying

Hallo,
Situation 1:
04 ABCDEF
02 ABFDEC
04 AEBFCD
02 AEFBCD
02 BFACDE
02 CDBEFA
04 CDBFEA
12 DECABF
08 ECDBFA
10 FABCDE
06 FABDEC
04 FEDBCA
A:B=40:20
A:C=30:30
A:D=30:30
A:E=30:30
A:F=24:36
B:C=34:26
B:D=30:30
B:E=30:30
B:F=38:22
C:D=36:24
C:E=22:38
C:F=30:30
D:E=42:18
D:F=30:30
E:F=32:28
The winner is candidate A.
Situation 2:
3 AEFCBD voters are added.
A:B=43:20
A:C=33:30
A:D=33:30
A:E=33:30
A:F=27:36
B:C=34:29
B:D=33:30
B:E=30:33
B:F=38:25
C:D=39:24
C:E=22:41
C:F=30:33
D:E=42:21
D:F=30:33
E:F=35:28
Now, the winner is candidate D.
Thus the 3 AEFCBD voters change the
winner from candidate A to candidate D.
******
John wrote (23 May 2003):
> instead, the per-option quorum will throw out the IDW in
> favour of a less-favoured option due to quorum requirements.
>
> R=15
> 10 ABD
> 5 BDA
I suggest that one should at first calculate the ranking of
the candidates according to the beat path method and then,
of those candidates whose beat path to the default option
meets the quorum, that candidate should be elected who is
ranked highest in the ranking of the beat path method.
That's the maximum that you can get without undermining
the intention of super-majority requirements.
In Situation 1, for example, the beat paths have the following
strengths:
A:B=40:36
A:C=34:32
A:D=34:32
A:E=34:32
A:F=38:36
B:C=34:32
B:D=34:32
B:E=34:32
B:F=38:36
C:D=36:38
C:E=36:38
C:F=32:34
D:E=42:36
D:F=32:34
E:F=32:34
Therefore, the ranking according to the beat path
method is ABFDEC.
Suppose that, for example, the default option is C
and the quorum is 38. Then the winner is candidate D.
Markus Schulze (not Martin Schulze)

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