Re: supermajority options
> > What would you think of an implementation of supermajority which has
> > this same general characteristic? [I ask this because Anthony Town's
> > most recent implied draft presents an implementation of supermajority
> > with exactly this property.]
On Sat, Nov 23, 2002 at 11:01:32AM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
> How does it have this property?
> As I understand Anthony Town's proposal, the supermajority
> requirement can kick out single options. After that the
> Condorcet method is used to find a winner (which not needs
> to be the default option).
Here's what I'm thinking (and, on re-reading what he wrote, I'll grant
you that there's several possible interpretations of his most recent
supermajority comes into play only when checking if the default option
defeats options with supermajority.
Cases where the default option defeats another option are never the
In other words, supermajority options are eliminated only when their
weakest defeats against schwartz set options are eliminated, and we have
a bias towards the default option in some (but not all) circumstances.
> A = change the scoial contract and remove non-free
> (Requires supermajority)
> B = try to nurture and increase non-free
> (Requires no supermajority)
> C = further discussion
> it could easily happen that A get's kicked out and B wins then.
> (Exmaple: 200 ABC, 102 BAC, 101 CAB)
What's wrong with B winning? B defeats C by 302:101 and A doesn't
satisfy supermajority. If you think something else should happen,
please explain why?
> Or did I understand this wrong?
I don't know, you tell me.