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Re: supermajority options

On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 05:59:37PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 11:36:27PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
> > 1) Implementing a quorum seems to have a lower risk of damaging
> >    Condorcet voting, than the discussed supermajority strategies have.
> This is a very interesting point.
> In fact, there are a number of insincere strategies around quorum,
> but we expect that they're not important because people using those
> strategies can only cause the default option to win, and the default
> option is just a short delay until the next vote.
> What would you think of an implementation of supermajority which has
> this same general characteristic?  [I ask this because Anthony Town's
> most recent implied draft presents an implementation of supermajority
> with exactly this property.]

How does it have this property?
As I understand Anthony Town's proposal, the supermajority
requirement can kick out single options.  After that the
Condorcet method is used to find a winner (which not needs
to be the default option).  In

 A = change the scoial contract and remove non-free
     (Requires supermajority)
 B = try to nurture and increase non-free
     (Requires no supermajority)
 C = further discussion

it could easily happen that A get's kicked out and B wins then.
(Exmaple: 200 ABC, 102 BAC, 101 CAB)

Or did I understand this wrong?

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