On Wed, Nov 20, 2002 at 05:06:01AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: > On Tue, Nov 19, 2002 at 11:58:35AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: > > It's probably worth comparing the strategies possible with this draft [...] > Consider 100 voters, a constitutional amendment, A, and a set of > conscientious objectors. The objectors vote: > 30 D A > This should, surely, be enough to stop "A" winning, no? Isn't that the point > of a supermajority requirement? > > If the remaining 70 people vote: > 70 A D > they'll succeed. If, however, they can introduce a cycle amongst A, D and > something else, and have D:A 90:70 be the weakest defeat, like so: > > Introducing the new option, B, no supermajority requirement. They convince > a bunch of the conscientious objectors to support it. > 20 B D A > 10 D A > 70 A B D > A defeats B (100:0), [...] So, Andrew Pimlott tells me I can't add up, which is fair enough. Let's try that one again. 30 D A 80 A D lets the 30 folks opposed to A defeat it by exercising their "superminority" powers. 20 B D A 10 D A B 80 A B D has: B defeats D (100:10), D defeats A (90:80), A defeats B (90:20). 90:80 is the weakest defeat, so is dropped, A wins. The A conspiracy have to convince some of the opposers to support B and some to be even more against B than they are against A, but neither seems out of the question. I think allowing a minority to block changes to the constitution, without any question of strategy confusing the issue is much more important whether that might be able to be used as a strategy later. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns <email@example.com> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/> I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``If you don't do it now, you'll be one year older when you do.''
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