Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > > > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > > > > 10 : 0 B:C
> > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > > > > > B wins.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:44:26AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > Mechanism.. how do I explain that I'm talking about the
> > mechanism itself..?
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 12:13:57AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> I'm not sure what you're talking about because in the above, A wins.
> (It's the Condorcet winner, so all Condorcet methods select it)
What I'm saying is that you can't meaningfully mix this Condorcet
mechanism with the concept of supermajority.
I'm also implying that there's probably a reason that the voting
mechanism in the constitution isn't labeled "Condorcet".
> Whatever method you're applying, you've either got a bad description of
> it, or you're doing something wrong.
Ok, try it this way: applying the concept of "supermajority" to
a Condorcet tallying mechanism is wrong.
> (Any method that declares B the winner is obviously broken beyond repair;
> but Condorcet methods don't do that)
Agreed: Condorcet + supermajority is broken. The simplifying assumptions
used by Condorcet are broken by the concept of supermajority.
Thanks,
--
Raul
Reply to: