[Date Prev][Date Next] [Thread Prev][Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]

Re: What next?

On Mon, Dec 18, 2000 at 10:29:06AM -0600, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
> 	Actually, since I had disconnected during the long debate that
>  progressed here, there was a lot of material to cover, and
>  digest. And I still think I would not be able to defend the method to
>  someone uninitiated; I need to go look for the papers on the voting
>  methods to be sure of my footing on this.
> 	However, I am willing to trust Raul and AJ to have researched
>  the underlying method, and the language is clean and understandable,
>  and thus I am willing to be a second for this proposal.

I'm still waiting for AJ to agree that the underlying method is

As I understand it, he agrees with just about everything in the vote
tallying method I proposed, except the handling of supermajority.
Last I heard, AJ was thinking about proposing an amended version of
my proposal such that when supermajority is relevant different voters
having differing voting strengths.

As far as theory goes: the Smith/Condorcet mechanism produces the same
outcome as our current mechanism, except in its handling of certain
kinds of ties.  If there's a circular tie, it tosses out the weakest
link of the chain, until the chain breaks.

The current mechanism can be made to ignore circular ties -- essentially,
you have to use A.6(2..4) only when there's a tie among first-preference
options (and A.6(6) when there's an all-around tie).  [Also, to properly
handle votes with mixed supermajorities, you have to eliminate the
"final" from A.6(7).]

I couldn't think of a good way of phrasing A.6(2..4) so they'd only
take effect when there's a first preference tie -- all my attempts took
more verbiage than my original attempt at Smith/Condorcet.  [Of course,
I've fleshed out the Smith/Condorcet procedure since then...]  If you
want me to give this another shot, I can give it a go.

Concorde (Single Transferrable Vote) biases the vote in the direction
of what people say is best, using other preferences only to resolve
ambiguity.  Smith/Condorcet biases the vote a bit more in the direction
of what the most people vote for.

Personally, I don't really care which underlying mechanism is used:
Smith/Condorcet or Concorde (Single Transferrable Vote).  I just want
something that's not ambiguous about vote counting.



Reply to: