On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: > But, let's try a simpler multi-option ballot, with everyone in favor. > Ballot: ABC, 3:1 supermajority required for A, 10 votes, all cast as: > ABC. > > If there was no supermajority, the ballots would look like: > > 10:0 A:B > 10:0 B:C > 10:0 A:C > > And you can figure out by inspection that A wins. > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: > > 10 : 0 B:C > 3 1/3: 0 A:B > 3 1/3: 0 A:C > > B wins. > > There is a similar flaw even without supermajority (by indicating a > second or even third preference, I can tip the balance in favor of another > option, causing it to win), but that's a bit more subtle to talk about. > > What's interesting is that most of the voting mechanisms you posted > about share this characteristic about supermajority votes. [Of course, > the characteristic goes away if you offer a simple 2 choice ballot, > because in that circumstance they're all equivalent.] Which sheds a great deal of light on the motivations behind his "amendment" to John Goerzen's proposal. -- G. Branden Robinson | <joeyh> oh my, it's a UP P III. Debian GNU/Linux | <doogie> dos it. branden@debian.org | * joeyh runs dselect http://www.debian.org/~branden/ | <Overfiend> that ought to be sufficient :)
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