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Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)



On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> But, let's try a simpler multi-option ballot, with everyone in favor.
> Ballot: ABC, 3:1 supermajority required for A, 10 votes, all cast as:
> ABC.
> 
> If there was no supermajority, the ballots would look like:
> 
> 10:0 A:B
> 10:0 B:C
> 10:0 A:C
> 
> And you can figure out by inspection that A wins.
> 
> However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> 
> 10    : 0  B:C
>  3 1/3: 0  A:B
>  3 1/3: 0  A:C
> 
> B wins.
> 
> There is a similar flaw even without supermajority (by indicating a
> second or even third preference, I can tip the balance in favor of another
> option, causing it to win), but that's a bit more subtle to talk about.
> 
> What's interesting is that most of the voting mechanisms you posted
> about share this characteristic about supermajority votes.  [Of course,
> the characteristic goes away if you offer a simple 2 choice ballot,
> because in that circumstance they're all equivalent.]

Which sheds a great deal of light on the motivations behind his "amendment"
to John Goerzen's proposal.

-- 
G. Branden Robinson             |  <joeyh> oh my, it's a UP P III.
Debian GNU/Linux                |  <doogie> dos it.
branden@debian.org              |  * joeyh runs dselect
http://www.debian.org/~branden/ |  <Overfiend> that ought to be sufficient :)

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