Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
> > What part of my proposed A.6 leads you to believe this? [It's other
> > parts of the constitution which specify how the ballots are constructed.]
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:16:14AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> If you still require N initial votes and 1 final vote, it has no benefit
> over the current wording, at all, since supermajorities only apply to
> final votes, which are forced to have simply Yes/No/Further Discussion
> as their options.
This is an allowed option, but it's not required. So the specific
case you mentioned can be handled in exactly the way you specified.
However, it could also be handled in a different fashion. This
would depend on the way the ballots are prepared.
> If you'd rather that I'd phrased it as "you instead just have a final
> vote, with the pairwise preferences", you're welcome to take it as that.
"It?" [Sorry, there's too many concepts flying around for me to parse
this reasonably.]
> Again, the three things that need to be changed in the constitution,
> IMO, are:
>
> a) resolving circular ties needs to be decided on and spelled out
I think I dealt with that.
> b) votes with multiple options need to be able to be handled by a
> single vote
That's already possible.
> c) supermajority requirements need to be updated to cope with (b)
There was a question about exactly what supermajority meant in this
context, and while I recognize the interpretations which give rise to
that ambiguity, I think I see what is supposed to happen there. I like
to believe that my alternate phrasing is unambiguous about this.
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:41:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> One problem if you don't have further discussion win more often than it
> perhaps should is as follows:
>
> Suppose you have three options on your ballot, A, B and F. A requires a
> 3:1 supermajority. Sincere preferences are:
> 60 people order the options A, B, F
> 40 people order the options B, A, F
> in which case A would win by dominating B 60:40 and F 100:0 (33.3:0).
Since a vote for B is a vote against A, I completely disagree with
this assesment.
Quoting the constitution:
7. If a supermajority is required the number of Yes votes in the
final ballot is reduced by an appropriate factor. Strictly
speaking, for a supermajority of F:A, the number of ballots which
prefer Yes to X (when considering whether Yes Dominates X or X
Dominates Yes) or the number of ballots whose first (remaining)
preference is Yes (when doing STV comparisons for winner and
elimination purposes) is multiplied by a factor A/F before the
comparison is done. This means that a 2:1 vote, for example, means
twice as many people voted for as against; abstentions are not
counted.
After substituting meta-syntactic variables, this would read:
7. If a supermajority is required the number of A votes in the
final ballot is reduced by an appropriate factor. Strictly
speaking, for a supermajority of 3:1, the number of ballots
which prefer A to B (when considering whether A Dominates B or
B Dominates A) or the number of ballots whose first (remaining)
preference is A (when doing STV comparisons for winner and
elimination purposes) is multiplied by a factor 1/3 before the
comparison is done. This means that a 3:1 vote, for example, means
three times as many people voted for as against; abstentions are
not counted.
[You might try to claim that some of these are not meta-syntactic
variables -- but that would be equivalent to the claim that there is no
3:1 supermajority requirement for A, in this vote.]
--
Raul
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