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Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)



Argh, Anthony is correct, I misread the implementation of quorum.

Let's try this again:

A.6(1)	An individual ballot is said to rank an option A above some
	other option B if it votes for option A but not option B, or if
	it votes for both options but assigns a lower canonical number
	to option A than it does to option B.

A.6(2)  An option A is said to be preferred to another option B,
	if there are more votes which rank option A above option B than
	there are votes which rank option B above option A.

A.6(3)  A supermajority requirement of n:m for an option A means that
	when votes are considered which indicate option A as a better
	choice than some other option B, the number of votes in favor
	of A are multiplied by m/n.

A.6(4)  The "Smith Set" is the smallest set of options such that
	every option in the set is preferred to every option outside
	the set.

A.6(5)  Any option not in the "Smith Set" is ignored.

A.6(6)	[iteratively] If there are multiple options in the Smith set,
	and one has fewer first preference votes than any other, it is
	ignored, and its second preference votes become first preference
	votes -- ballots which indicate no second preference are ignored.
	[In case of ties which could potentially affect the outcome of
	the vote, the person with the casting vote will choose.]

A.6(7)  When only one option remains unignored, if more than quorum votes
	prefer that option to the default option, the unignored option wins.
	Otherwise, the default option wins.



Thanks,

-- 
Raul



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