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Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)

On Tue, Nov 14, 2000 at 12:00:05AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
> Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how Condorcet-based 
> voting schemes work in the face of a supermajority requirement?


The current way it's meant to work is that the supermajority only comes
into play on the final vote, where YES needs the appropriate supermajority
over NO and FURTHER DISCUSSION (see A.6(7)).

If you required a supermajority over *every* other option, you'd end up
with the situation where if *everyone* prefers, say, both Manoj's and
Branden's possibilities over the current situation, but they're split
as to which one they think is the better of the two, then neither will
be accepted (since there'll be a 1:1 split between the two, rather than
a 3:1 supermajority).

It might be enough to simply require a 3:1 (or whatever) supermajority of
the winning option to NO and FURTHER DISCUSSION? It might be possible for
the vote counting systems in the previous mail to pick a winner that only
has a 2:1 supermajority when a 3:1 supermajority's required. Exactly how
to resolve that probably requires detailed thought. Whether it should
be resolved, is another matter too (if "remove non-free" is ranked as
slightly preferable to "we love non-free", but doesn't quite meet its
supermajority requirements (supposing there are some), should "we love
non-free" win instead, or should the vote devolve to further discussion,


Anthony Towns <aj@humbug.org.au> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/>
I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred.

  ``We reject: kings, presidents, and voting.
                 We believe in: rough consensus and working code.''
                                      -- Dave Clark

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