Re: PROPOSED: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Alternate disambiguation of 4.1.5
On Tue, Oct 10, 2000 at 12:32:00PM -0500, John Goerzen wrote:
> It seems to me that a 3:1 majority is exceedingly excessive; requiring
> 75% of people to agree seems to me to be an unreasonably high limit.
>
> -- John
The other viewpoint: one "simple" vote and 25% of Developers have the
Constitution yanked from under them. Seems like a classic Tyranny of the
Majority illustrated so well by the way bannana republics like the U.S. and
Australia treat their minority populations.
On a related issue, supermajorities aren't quite this simple though. I
cannot quite fathom how supermajorities and Condorcet counting work
together, and this bothers me. Hopefully the Secretary will present us with
very simple supermajority ballots so that the working is more obvious than
the general case. I think I would encourage people to rank whatever they
wish 1st, and Further Discussion 2nd on supermajority ballots so that
options not supported by 75% of the membership as their first preference
cannot pass.
A.6. Concorde Vote Counting
7. If a supermajority is required the number of Yes votes in the
final ballot is reduced by an appropriate factor. Strictly
speaking, for a supermajority of F:A, the number of ballots which
prefer Yes to X (when considering whether Yes Dominates X or X
Dominates Yes) or the number of ballots whose first (remaining)
preference is Yes (when doing STV comparisons for winner and
elimination purposes) is multiplied by a factor A/F before the
comparison is done. This means that a 2:1 vote, for example, means
twice as many people voted for as against; abstentions are not
counted.
8. If a quorum is required, there must be at least that many votes
which prefer the winning option to the default option. If there
are not then the default option wins after all. For votes
requiring a supermajority, the actual number of Yes votes is used
when checking whether the quorum has been reached.
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