[Date Prev][Date Next] [Thread Prev][Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]

Re: entgültiges Löschen von Dateien im NTFS-Dateisystem



Am Donnerstag 17 Juni 2010 schrieb Michael Lange:
> Und aus http://wiki.ubuntuusers.de/wipe entnehme ich
> 
>     Wipe ist ein Kommandozeilenprogramm zum sicheren Löschen und
>     Überschreiben von Dateien, Ordnern und Device-Files (wie zum
>     Beispiel Partitionen). Dateien, die auf diese Weise entfernt
> werden, können selbst mit forensischen Methoden der Spezialisten nicht
> mehr wiederhergestellt werden und sind unwiderruflich zerstört. Im
> Unterschied zu shred kann Wipe auch Ordner löschen und bietet ein paar
> mehr Einstellungsmöglichkeiten.
> 
> was nahelegt, dass der Vorposter doch prinzipiell recht hat.

Nope. Siehe meine Erklärungen dazu. Und die Manpage von wipe:

NOTE ABOUT JOURNALING FILESYSTEMS AND SOME  RECOMMENDATIONS  (JUNE
       2004)
       Journaling  filesystems  (such as Ext3 or ReiserFS) are now
       being used by default  by  most  Linux  distributions.   No
       secure  deletion  program  that does filesystem-level calls
       can sanitize files on such filesystems,  because  sensitive
       data and metadata can be written to the journal, which can‐
       not be readily accessed.  Per-file secure deletion is  bet‐
       ter implemented in the operating system.
[...]
       Be aware that harddisks are quite intelligent beasts  those
       days.   They  transparently  remap  defective blocks.  This
       means that the disk can keep  an  albeit  corrupted  (maybe
       slightly)  but  inaccessible and unerasable copy of some of
       your data.  Modern disks are said to have about 100% trans‐
       parent  remapping  capacity.  You can have a look at recent
       discussions on Slashdot.

[... Verschwörungstheoretische Überlegungen ...]

IMPORTANT WARNING -- READ CAREFULLY
[...]

       Similarly,  we  cannot  guarantee  that  wipe will actually
       erase data, or  that  wiped  data  is  not  recoverable  by
       advanced means.  So if nasties get your secrets because you
       sold a wiped harddisk to someone you don't know, well,  too
       bad for you.
[...]
       The  best way to sanitize a storage medium is to subject it
       to temperatures exceeding 1500K.  As a  cheap  alternative,
       you  might  use  wipe at your own risk. Be aware that it is
       very difficult to assess whether running wipe  on  a  given
       file will actually wipe it -- it depends on an awful lot of
       factors, such as : the type of file system the file resides
       on  (in particular, whether the file system is a journaling
       one or not), the type of storage medium used, and the least
       significant bit of the phase of the moon.

       Wiping  over NFS or over a journalling filesystem (ReiserFS
       etc.) will most probably not work.

       Therefore I strongly recommend to call wipe directly on the
       corresponding  block  device  with the appropriate options.
       However THIS IS AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS  THING  TO  DO.   Be
       sure  to  be sober. Give the right options. In particular :
       don't wipe a whole harddisk (eg. wipe -kD /dev/hda is  bad)
       since  this will destroy your master boot record. Bad idea.
       Prefer wiping partitions (eg. wipe -kD /dev/hda2) is  good,
       provided,  of course, that you have backed up all necessary
       data.

Das geht also ganz in die Richtung meiner Überlegungen, dass es gar nicht 
so leicht ist, zu sagen, ob wipe die Daten wirklich an Ort und Stelle 
überschreibt und ob es keine anderen Kopien durch Remapping defekter 
Blöcke und Ähnliches gibt.

Ciao,
-- 
Martin 'Helios' Steigerwald - http://www.Lichtvoll.de
GPG: 03B0 0D6C 0040 0710 4AFA  B82F 991B EAAC A599 84C7

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part.


Reply to: