Re: Debian mirrors and MITM
On 07/03/2014 12:58 PM, Reid Sutherland wrote:
> On Jul 3, 2014, at 12:46 PM, Hans-Christoph Steiner <email@example.com> wrote:
>> SSH uses entirely unsigned keys, and it has proven a lot more reliable than
>> HTTPS/TLS. You use HTTPS/TLS keys the same way as SSH, but TLS requires
>> signed keys, self-signed works. The signatures are only worth the trust path
>> behind them, and CAs have not proven to be reliable trust paths. So if you
>> can't rely on the signatures, why bother using them? This is not just my
>> opinion, but of many others. Google uses SPKI pinning heavily, for example,
>> but they still use CA-signed certificates so their HTTPS works with Firefox,
>> IE, Opera, etc.
> SSH is hand verified when you connect initially (thus creating a “signature”).
That is not a crypto signature like on a TLS certificate or OpenPGP key. But
I guess you could call writing the public key to ~/.ssh/known_hosts a
signature of sorts.
> Are you are going to hand-verify each signature / key? And then against what? Why not just verify the CD download once and be done with it? If you are paranoid, build a trust relationship with a mirror that provides SSL and save their cert.
> Anyway, I’m really over this.
> Have a good day.
I suggest you read the links that I included, they discuss these questions and
more. Pinning means that the SPKI comes included in the software, like in the
iso that you mention. In SSH speak, that would be like distributing an SSH
known_hosts file along with the iso.