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Re: Cite for print-to-postscript exploit in Mozilla?

[Snipping practically all of the cross-post distribution.]

Quoting Kevin B. McCarty (kmccarty@princeton.edu):

> But is there any way in which Mozilla's print-to-postscript is _less_
> safe than using gv to open up a random PostScript file found somewhere
> on the Internet?

Thus the -dSAFER option, which you should look up post-haste, if you
weren't aware of it.  Fortunately, utilities that use the ghostscript
utilities for not-necessarily-trustworthy files tend to be written by
people who _are_ aware of it.

    Disables the "deletefile" and "renamefile" operators and
    the ability to open files in any mode other than read-only. 
    This is desirable for spoolers or any other environments where a
    malicious or badly written PostScript program must be
    prevented from changing important files.

On a related note, does anyone know if xpdf takes (or can be made to
take) the same sort of precautions?  After all, a PDF is basically just
a PS file, so I imagine the same sorts of attack are possible.

A run through the manpage was unenlightening.

(Ah, I see Kevin has the same concern.)

Rick Moen                                        This space for rant.

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