Re: Cite for print-to-postscript exploit in Mozilla?
[Snipping practically all of the cross-post distribution.]
Quoting Kevin B. McCarty (email@example.com):
> But is there any way in which Mozilla's print-to-postscript is _less_
> safe than using gv to open up a random PostScript file found somewhere
> on the Internet?
Thus the -dSAFER option, which you should look up post-haste, if you
weren't aware of it. Fortunately, utilities that use the ghostscript
utilities for not-necessarily-trustworthy files tend to be written by
people who _are_ aware of it.
Disables the "deletefile" and "renamefile" operators and
the ability to open files in any mode other than read-only.
This is desirable for spoolers or any other environments where a
malicious or badly written PostScript program must be
prevented from changing important files.
On a related note, does anyone know if xpdf takes (or can be made to
take) the same sort of precautions? After all, a PDF is basically just
a PS file, so I imagine the same sorts of attack are possible.
A run through the manpage was unenlightening.
(Ah, I see Kevin has the same concern.)
Rick Moen This space for rant.