On Fri, Jul 28, 2000 at 08:11:12AM +0000, Jim Breton wrote: > On Thu, Jul 27, 2000 at 11:56:03PM -0800, Ethan Benson wrote: > > pam_group is only relativly secure if your system is installed and > > configured a certain way: > > Yup, some of that is mentioned in the documentation... nevertheless, it > would be a big improvement over making the socket world-writable. perhaps, or perhaps only trusted users should be granted gid=mouse. > Red Hat are using a pam_console module for this, here is an excerpt from > their advisory: > > "For 6.x, the /dev/gpmctl ownership issue was addressed via the > pam_console helper mechanism. This pam module makes devices > which need to be accessible via console users owned by them and > no one else." pam_console is evil. its a bigger security hole then gpmctl is. besides that pam_console is not secure anyway since one can hold a file descriptor open on anything except a tty thus retaining access even when permissions/owners are changed. (that may not work on a socket, i don't really know) > > > what is gpmctl actually used for anyway? > > I don't know exactly! ;) But here's what the gpm man page says: > > /dev/gpmctl A control socket for clients gee thats descriptive... > And the file only exists while gpm is running (it's removed when you > stop gpm) so I am guessing it is the socket through which clients read > mouse data. that means you have to play games with the initscript to change its permissions.. -- Ethan Benson http://www.alaska.net/~erbenson/
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