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Re: Should we just remove openwebmail?



On Thu, Apr 28, 2005 at 11:20:22PM +1000, Andrew Pollock wrote:
> openwebmail is orphaned, but has only been so for 32 days.
> 
> That said, it's got security issues, and hasn't been part of a stable
> release.
> 
> So I'm personally inclined not to let it linger for a while on the grounds
> that it's got security issues, and just get it the hell out of the archive.
> It's not like Debian's short of webmail packages.
> 
> That said, a non-DD has prepared an updated package as of a week ago, but no
> one has sponsored it yet.
> 
> Just wondering what peoples' thoughts are?

I took a look at the current upstream version (2.51).

 * cgi-bin/openwebmail/modules/tool.pl: Upstream no longer uses completely
   predictable temporary filenames, but the race condition between checking
   whether a file exists and actually opening it is still there.

 * cgi-bin/openwebmail/openwebmail-abook.pl: The user can execute arbitrary
   commands by passing "file=; ... |" to addrviewatt().

 * cgi-bin/openwebmail/openwebmail-folder.pl: The user can execute arbitrary
   commands by passing "folder=; ... |" to downloadfolder().

 * cgi-bin/openwebmail/openwebmail-webdisk.pl: If the user has FTP access
   and uploads a file named "; ... |", editfile() and downloadfile() will
   execute the command.

 * cgi-bin/openwebmail/openwebmail-webdisk.pl: The user can execute
   arbitrary commands by uploading a URL in the form "http://foo/; ...".

I stopped looking at this point.  The code is rife with vulnerabilities, and
needs to be audited line by line; I'm not sure this is likely anytime soon.
I think we should remove it.  (It can always be added back if it's fixed.)

Thanks,

Matej



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