Timo Röhling <timo@gaussglocke.de> writes:
I would like to implement a cryptographic protocol that provides the
same level of verifiability for secret votes as the currently used
public votes. In particular, I would like to see some additional proof
that the published hash values actually belong to eligible voters.
As Kurt mentioned (but buried in one of those debian-vote threads), take a
look at Belenios if you aren't already familiar with it.
https://www.belenios.org/
It presumably would need some work to be usable for Debian votes due to
needing integration with PGP signatures and our keyring, and unfortunately
we can't use the really cool homomorphic encryption mode because we want
to do Condorcet, but it otherwise seems like the right sort of direction.
As a bonus, the developer is a member of the Debian project.
I would rather an existing system like that, which has already undergone
some cryptographic peer review, than for us to try to come up with
something novel. Secure online voting is an insanely hard problem, and
while we have enough unique conditions that we can probably relax the
constraints that make it unsafe for general population political
elections, there are still a lot of ways it can go wrong that are very
inobvious.