Re: soc-ctte discussion at DebConf7 [was Re: Social committee proposal]
Raphael Hertzog writes ("Re: soc-ctte discussion at DebConf7 [was Re: Social committee proposal]"):
> Basicaly, any communication concerning the "proactive" part shall be
> private. The person receiving the warning can publicize it by themselves
> if they so desire (but it's certainly not expected to be the general rule,
> it's just to avoid the criticism of lack of transparency).
> We also agreed that the formulation was a bit broad. For instance,
> granting "adm" membership (ie DSA team rights) is also an ACL decision,
> but it's certainly not the resort of the social ctte.
> So we sort of decided that it should:
> - make ACL decisions concerning the Debian lists (the listmasters clearly
> indicated that they don't want to take those by themselves)
> This includes the possibility to decide ML bans for DD as well as
> for non-DD.
> - make decision concerning DD's behaviour everywhere where they are acting
> as member/representative of the project (including #debian* IRC channels).
> - make recommandation to any other party that defers a judgment to the
> social ctte (example: the OFTC admin defers a dispute on the
> soc-ctte over ownership of a channel #debian*)
> Since it's a "delegated body", the DPL can grant additionals powers if
This is a good alternative to explicitly specifying the powers.
> We have decided to have 2 GR at the same time. One deciding the creation
> of the soc-ctte and one deciding its membership.
> AFAIR, the consensus was that:
> - by default, every 2 years the project has to reapprove individually each
> member of the soc-ctte. This gives the project an opportunity to recall
> members who are judged as no more representative or whatever.
> Reapproving probably means having more ranking above NOTA than rankings
> below NOTA. Maybe we should make that ratio 66%.
I remember 1 year rather than 2 but it doesn't make much difference.
I disagree about the voting system. We should use straight approval
voting: each voter votes `yes' or `no' separately for each candidate.
Candidates who get more `yes' than `no' get to stay. Others are
The DPL will then make up the numbers. Obviously the DPL is expected
not to reappoint the dismissed members (even though that's technically
I don't think it's necessarily a problem that the DPL has in theory
powers which the SC setup expects the leader not to use. After all
any such outrage could be overruled by GR.