Re: Range Voting - the simpler better alternative to Condorcet voting
> Ireland uses STV, which is not a Condorcet voting system.
Although true, from a voter's perspective they're pretty much
identical: rank the candidates, any left unranked are implicitly at
the bottom. Furthermore, I would dare to venture that even our
sophisticated Debian Developer voters by-and-large do not understand
the minutia of our particular Condorcet resolution mechanism.
I will however admit that I've been told by a number of Irishmen that
one reason for the use of STV here is that it makes for a lot of fun
in the post-voting and postmortem parts of the elections.
> Nice try though, it was a very good troll otherwise.
If by "trolling" you mean "pointing out when Steve Langasek makes an
invalid argument", then I plead guilty as charged.
To quote the relevant lines from http://rangevoting.org/vsi.html
where VSI is the Voter Satisfaction Index,
> Voting system VSI A VSI B
> Magically elect optimum winner 100.00% 100.00%
> Range (honest voters) 96.71% 94.66%
> Condorcet-LR (honest voters) 85.19% 85.43%
> Range (strategic exaggerating voters) 78.99% 77.01%
> Condorcet-LR (strategic exaggerating voters) 42.56% 41.31%
> ... These experimental results also strongly suggest that range
> voting is the least susceptible to strategic voting, of these common
It would appear that in this table, when voters merely exaggerate
their preferences, which is a natural human tendency, Range Voting
degrades from ~95% VSI to ~78% VSI while Condorcet-LR degrades from
85% to 42%. OUCH! It seems like even a small amount of strategic
voting in Condorcet would push its performance below that of Range
voting with fully strategic voting.
Barak A. Pearlmutter
Hamilton Institute & Dept Comp Sci, NUI Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland