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[RFR] po-debconf://cgiemail



Anibal Monsalve Salazar
--
 .''`.  Debian GNU/Linux      | Building 28C
: :' :  Free Operating System | Monash University VIC 3800, Australia
`. `'   http://debian.org/    | http://www-personal.monash.edu/~anibal/
  `-                          |
#
#    Translators, if you are not familiar with the PO format, gettext
#    documentation is worth reading, especially sections dedicated to
#    this format, e.g. by running:
#         info -n '(gettext)PO Files'
#         info -n '(gettext)Header Entry'
#
#    Some information specific to po-debconf are available at
#            /usr/share/doc/po-debconf/README-trans
#         or http://www.debian.org/intl/l10n/po-debconf/README-trans
#
#    Developers do not need to manually edit POT or PO files.
#
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: cgiemail (1.6-20)\n"
"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2004-06-03 23:26-0300\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: 2004-06-03 23:26-0300\n"
"Last-Translator: Anibal Monsalve Salazar <A.Monsalve.Salazar@IEEE.org>\n"
"Language-Team: debian-l10n-spanish <debian-l10n-spanish@lists.debian.org>\n"
"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-15\n"
"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"

#. Description
#: ../templates:4
msgid "Where do you want to put cgiemail's mail templates?"
msgstr "¿Dónde quiere que cgiemail ponga la plantillas de correo?"

#. Description
#: ../templates:4
msgid ""
"In old versions of cgiemail, templates that were used for creating e-mails "
"to be sent could be placed anywhere that would be served up by the web "
"server.  This behaviour is a security vulnerability: an attacker can read "
"files that he shouldn't be able to, such as scripts in cgi-bin, if they "
"contain certain pieces of text."
msgstr ""
"En versiones anteriores de cgiemail, las plantillas usadas para crear correos "
"para ser enviado, se podian poner en cualquier directorio que pudiera utilizar "
"el servidor web. Este comportamiento es un vulnerabilidad de seguridad ya que "
"un atacante podría leer ficheros (tales como scripts en el directorio cgi-bin) "
"si ellos tienen cierto texto y sin tener permiso para leerlos."

#. Description
#: ../templates:4
msgid ""
"If you enter nothing (that is, erase the default directory, leaving this "
"empty), cgiemail will still work. This may be needed if you are, for "
"instance, hosting web services, and cannot move all of your clients cgiemail "
"templates to one directory.  Remember that this will LEAVE THE SECURITY HOLE "
"OPEN, and is only a choice for backwards compatibility."
msgstr ""
"Si usted entra nada (es decir, borra el directorio por defecto, dejándolo en "
"blanco), cgiemail trabajará. Esto puede ser necesario si usted no puede poner "
"todas las plantillas de cgiemail de todos sus clientes, en el caso de hospedaje "
"de servicios web, en un sólo directorio. Tenga en cuenta que esto dejará ABIERTO "
"EL HUECO DE SEGURIDAD, pero es la única opción para compatibiladad regresiva."

#. Description
#: ../templates:4
msgid ""
"To close the hole, enter a directory, which MUST be accessible by your web "
"server.  Template files that you want to use should go there. For further "
"instructions, please read the README.Debian and README files in /usr/share/"
"doc/cgiemail/."
msgstr ""
"Para cerrar el hueco de seguridad, entre un directorio, que TIENE que poder "
"ser leido por su servidor web. Las plantillas deben ponerse en "
"ese directorio. Para más información, por favor lea los ficheros README.Debian "
"y README que están en /usr/share/doc/cgiemail/."

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