Bug#770492: [RFC PATCH RESEND] vfs: Move security_inode_killpriv() after permission checks
- To: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
- Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, 770492@bugs.debian.org, Ben Harris <bjh21@cam.ac.uk>, oss-security@lists.openwall.com, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
- Subject: Bug#770492: [RFC PATCH RESEND] vfs: Move security_inode_killpriv() after permission checks
- From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
- Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2015 10:17:29 +1100 (AEDT)
- Message-id: <[🔎] alpine.LRH.2.11.1501211014580.15885@namei.org>
- Reply-to: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, 770492@bugs.debian.org
- In-reply-to: <[🔎] 1421537206.31046.74.camel@decadent.org.uk>
- References: <[🔎] 1421537206.31046.74.camel@decadent.org.uk>
On Sat, 17 Jan 2015, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> chown() and write() should clear all privilege attributes on
> a file - setuid, setgid, setcap and any other extended
> privilege attributes.
>
> However, any attributes beyond setuid and setgid are managed by the
> LSM and not directly by the filesystem, so they cannot be set along
> with the other attributes.
>
> Currently we call security_inode_killpriv() in notify_change(),
> but in case of a chown() this is too early - we have not called
> inode_change_ok() or made any filesystem-specific permission/sanity
> checks.
>
> Add a new function setattr_killpriv() which calls
> security_inode_killpriv() if necessary, and change the setattr()
> implementation to call this in each filesystem that supports xattrs.
> This assumes that extended privilege attributes are always stored in
> xattrs.
It'd be useful to get some input from LSM module maintainers on this.
e.g. doesn't SELinux already handle this via policy directives?
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
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