Bug#770492: [RFC PATCH RESEND] vfs: Move security_inode_killpriv() after permission checks
- To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
- Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, 770492@bugs.debian.org, Ben Harris <bjh21@cam.ac.uk>, oss-security@lists.openwall.com, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
- Subject: Bug#770492: [RFC PATCH RESEND] vfs: Move security_inode_killpriv() after permission checks
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
- Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2015 15:32:53 -0800
- Message-id: <[🔎] 54BEE5A5.5050807@schaufler-ca.com>
- Reply-to: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, 770492@bugs.debian.org
- In-reply-to: <[🔎] alpine.LRH.2.11.1501211014580.15885@namei.org>
- References: <[🔎] 1421537206.31046.74.camel@decadent.org.uk> <[🔎] alpine.LRH.2.11.1501211014580.15885@namei.org>
On 1/20/2015 3:17 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Sat, 17 Jan 2015, Ben Hutchings wrote:
>
>> chown() and write() should clear all privilege attributes on
>> a file - setuid, setgid, setcap and any other extended
>> privilege attributes.
>>
>> However, any attributes beyond setuid and setgid are managed by the
>> LSM and not directly by the filesystem, so they cannot be set along
>> with the other attributes.
>>
>> Currently we call security_inode_killpriv() in notify_change(),
>> but in case of a chown() this is too early - we have not called
>> inode_change_ok() or made any filesystem-specific permission/sanity
>> checks.
>>
>> Add a new function setattr_killpriv() which calls
>> security_inode_killpriv() if necessary, and change the setattr()
>> implementation to call this in each filesystem that supports xattrs.
>> This assumes that extended privilege attributes are always stored in
>> xattrs.
> It'd be useful to get some input from LSM module maintainers on this.
I've already chimed in.
Clearing the Smack label on a file because someone writes to it
makes no sense whatsoever. The same with chown. The Smack label is
attached to the object, which is a container of data, not the data
itself. Smack labels are Mandatory Access Control labels, not Information
labels. If that doesn't mean anything to the reader, check out the
P1003.1e/2c (withdrawn) DRAFT.
The proposed implementation does not correctly handle either
Mandatory Access Control labels or Information labels. The MAC
label is *very different* from the setuid bit.
>
> e.g. doesn't SELinux already handle this via policy directives?
>
>
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