Dear security team, I have prepared a security update for axis to fix CVE-2014-3596 (#762444) by replacing the old patch for CVE-2012-5784 with the new one provided by the Red Hat security team. I'm attaching the debdiff against the version of axis in stable. Please let me know if the changes qualify for a stable-security release. Description =========== The getCN function in Apache Axis 1.4 and earlier does not properly verify that the server hostname matches a domain name in the subject's Common Name (CN) or subjectAltName field of the X.509 certificate, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof SSL servers via a certificate with a subject that specifies a common name in a field that is not the CN field. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2012-5784. References ========== * http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3596 * https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2014-3596 * https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/AXIS-2905 * https://issues.apache.org/jira/secure/attachment/12662672/CVE-2014-3596.patch Regards, Markus
diff -Nru axis-1.4/debian/changelog axis-1.4/debian/changelog
--- axis-1.4/debian/changelog 2012-12-06 14:41:46.000000000 +0100
+++ axis-1.4/debian/changelog 2014-10-01 17:49:08.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,19 @@
+axis (1.4-16.2+deb7u1) wheezy-security; urgency=high
+
+ * Team upload.
+ * Fix CVE-2014-3596.
+ - Replace 06-fix-CVE-2012-5784.patch with CVE-2014-3596.patch which fixes
+ both CVE issues. Thanks to Raphael Hertzog for the report.
+ - The getCN function in Apache Axis 1.4 and earlier does not properly
+ verify that the server hostname matches a domain name in the subject's
+ Common Name (CN) or subjectAltName field of the X.509 certificate,
+ which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof SSL servers via a
+ certificate with a subject that specifies a common name in a field
+ that is not the CN field. NOTE: this issue exists because of an
+ incomplete fix for CVE-2012-5784.
+
+ -- Markus Koschany <apo@gambaru.de> Wed, 01 Oct 2014 17:40:19 +0200
+
axis (1.4-16.2) unstable; urgency=low
* Non-maintainer upload.
diff -Nru axis-1.4/debian/patches/06-fix-CVE-2012-5784.patch axis-1.4/debian/patches/06-fix-CVE-2012-5784.patch
--- axis-1.4/debian/patches/06-fix-CVE-2012-5784.patch 2012-12-06 13:45:17.000000000 +0100
+++ axis-1.4/debian/patches/06-fix-CVE-2012-5784.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,329 +0,0 @@
-Description: Fixed CN extraction from DN of X500 principal and wildcard validation
-
- axis (1.4-16.2) unstable; urgency=low
-
- * Fixed CN extraction from DN of X500 principal and wildcard validation
-
-Author: Alberto Fernández Martínez <infjaf@gmail.com>
-
-
-Origin: other
-Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/692650
-Forwarded: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/AXIS-2883
-Last-Update: <2012-12-06>
-
---- axis-1.4.orig/src/org/apache/axis/components/net/JSSESocketFactory.java
-+++ axis-1.4/src/org/apache/axis/components/net/JSSESocketFactory.java
-@@ -15,12 +15,6 @@
- */
- package org.apache.axis.components.net;
-
--import org.apache.axis.utils.Messages;
--import org.apache.axis.utils.XMLUtils;
--import org.apache.axis.utils.StringUtils;
--
--import javax.net.ssl.SSLSocket;
--import javax.net.ssl.SSLSocketFactory;
- import java.io.BufferedWriter;
- import java.io.IOException;
- import java.io.InputStream;
-@@ -28,7 +22,27 @@ import java.io.OutputStream;
- import java.io.OutputStreamWriter;
- import java.io.PrintWriter;
- import java.net.Socket;
-+import java.security.cert.Certificate;
-+import java.security.cert.CertificateParsingException;
-+import java.security.cert.X509Certificate;
-+import java.util.Arrays;
-+import java.util.Collection;
- import java.util.Hashtable;
-+import java.util.Iterator;
-+import java.util.LinkedList;
-+import java.util.List;
-+import java.util.Locale;
-+import java.util.StringTokenizer;
-+import java.util.regex.Pattern;
-+
-+import javax.net.ssl.SSLException;
-+import javax.net.ssl.SSLSession;
-+import javax.net.ssl.SSLSocket;
-+import javax.net.ssl.SSLSocketFactory;
-+
-+import org.apache.axis.utils.Messages;
-+import org.apache.axis.utils.StringUtils;
-+import org.apache.axis.utils.XMLUtils;
-
-
- /**
-@@ -41,6 +55,10 @@ import java.util.Hashtable;
- */
- public class JSSESocketFactory extends DefaultSocketFactory implements SecureSocketFactory {
-
-+ // This is a a sorted list, if you insert new elements do it orderdered.
-+ private final static String[] BAD_COUNTRY_2LDS =
-+ {"ac", "co", "com", "ed", "edu", "go", "gouv", "gov", "info",
-+ "lg", "ne", "net", "or", "org"};
- /** Field sslFactory */
- protected SSLSocketFactory sslFactory = null;
-
-@@ -187,6 +205,260 @@ public class JSSESocketFactory extends D
- if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
- log.debug(Messages.getMessage("createdSSL00"));
- }
-+ verifyHostName(host, (SSLSocket) sslSocket);
- return sslSocket;
- }
-+ /**
-+ * Verifies that the given hostname in certicifate is the hostname we are trying to connect to
-+ * http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5783/
-+ * @param host
-+ * @param ssl
-+ * @throws IOException
-+ */
-+
-+ private static void verifyHostName(String host, SSLSocket ssl)
-+ throws IOException {
-+ if (host == null) {
-+ throw new IllegalArgumentException("host to verify was null");
-+ }
-+
-+ SSLSession session = ssl.getSession();
-+ if (session == null) {
-+ // In our experience this only happens under IBM 1.4.x when
-+ // spurious (unrelated) certificates show up in the server's chain.
-+ // Hopefully this will unearth the real problem:
-+ InputStream in = ssl.getInputStream();
-+ in.available();
-+ /*
-+ If you're looking at the 2 lines of code above because you're
-+ running into a problem, you probably have two options:
-+
-+ #1. Clean up the certificate chain that your server
-+ is presenting (e.g. edit "/etc/apache2/server.crt" or
-+ wherever it is your server's certificate chain is
-+ defined).
-+
-+ OR
-+
-+ #2. Upgrade to an IBM 1.5.x or greater JVM, or switch to a
-+ non-IBM JVM.
-+ */
-+
-+ // If ssl.getInputStream().available() didn't cause an exception,
-+ // maybe at least now the session is available?
-+ session = ssl.getSession();
-+ if (session == null) {
-+ // If it's still null, probably a startHandshake() will
-+ // unearth the real problem.
-+ ssl.startHandshake();
-+
-+ // Okay, if we still haven't managed to cause an exception,
-+ // might as well go for the NPE. Or maybe we're okay now?
-+ session = ssl.getSession();
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ Certificate[] certs = session.getPeerCertificates();
-+ verifyHostName(host.trim().toLowerCase(Locale.US), (X509Certificate) certs[0]);
-+ }
-+ /**
-+ * Extract the names from the certificate and tests host matches one of them
-+ * @param host
-+ * @param cert
-+ * @throws SSLException
-+ */
-+
-+ private static void verifyHostName(final String host, X509Certificate cert)
-+ throws SSLException {
-+ // I'm okay with being case-insensitive when comparing the host we used
-+ // to establish the socket to the hostname in the certificate.
-+ // Don't trim the CN, though.
-+
-+ String cn = getCN(cert);
-+ String[] subjectAlts = getDNSSubjectAlts(cert);
-+ verifyHostName(host, cn.toLowerCase(Locale.US), subjectAlts);
-+
-+ }
-+
-+ /**
-+ * Extract all alternative names from a certificate.
-+ * @param cert
-+ * @return
-+ */
-+ private static String[] getDNSSubjectAlts(X509Certificate cert) {
-+ LinkedList subjectAltList = new LinkedList();
-+ Collection c = null;
-+ try {
-+ c = cert.getSubjectAlternativeNames();
-+ } catch (CertificateParsingException cpe) {
-+ // Should probably log.debug() this?
-+ cpe.printStackTrace();
-+ }
-+ if (c != null) {
-+ Iterator it = c.iterator();
-+ while (it.hasNext()) {
-+ List list = (List) it.next();
-+ int type = ((Integer) list.get(0)).intValue();
-+ // If type is 2, then we've got a dNSName
-+ if (type == 2) {
-+ String s = (String) list.get(1);
-+ subjectAltList.add(s);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (!subjectAltList.isEmpty()) {
-+ String[] subjectAlts = new String[subjectAltList.size()];
-+ subjectAltList.toArray(subjectAlts);
-+ return subjectAlts;
-+ } else {
-+ return new String[0];
-+ }
-+
-+ }
-+ /**
-+ * Verifies
-+ * @param host
-+ * @param cn
-+ * @param subjectAlts
-+ * @throws SSLException
-+ */
-+
-+ private static void verifyHostName(final String host, String cn, String[] subjectAlts)throws SSLException{
-+ StringBuffer cnTested = new StringBuffer();
-+
-+ for (int i = 0; i < subjectAlts.length; i++){
-+ String name = subjectAlts[i];
-+ if (name != null) {
-+ name = name.toLowerCase(Locale.US);
-+ if (verifyHostName(host, name)){
-+ return;
-+ }
-+ cnTested.append("/").append(name);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (cn != null && verifyHostName(host, cn)){
-+ return;
-+ }
-+ cnTested.append("/").append(cn);
-+ throw new SSLException("hostname in certificate didn't match: <"
-+ + host + "> != <" + cnTested + ">");
-+
-+ }
-+
-+ private static boolean verifyHostName(final String host, final String cn){
-+ if (doWildCard(cn) && !isIPAddress(host)) {
-+ return matchesWildCard(cn, host);
-+ }
-+ return host.equalsIgnoreCase(cn);
-+ }
-+ private static boolean doWildCard(String cn) {
-+ // Contains a wildcard
-+ // wildcard in the first block
-+ // not an ipaddress (ip addres must explicitily be equal)
-+ // not using 2nd level common tld : ex: not for *.co.uk
-+ String parts[] = cn.split("\\.");
-+ return parts.length >= 3 &&
-+ parts[0].endsWith("*") &&
-+ acceptableCountryWildcard(cn) &&
-+ !isIPAddress(cn);
-+ }
-+
-+ private static final Pattern IPV4_PATTERN =
-+ Pattern.compile("^(25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|[0-1]?\\d?\\d)(\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|[0-1]?\\d?\\d)){3}$");
-+
-+ private static final Pattern IPV6_STD_PATTERN =
-+ Pattern.compile("^(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){7}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}$");
-+
-+ private static final Pattern IPV6_HEX_COMPRESSED_PATTERN =
-+ Pattern.compile("^((?:[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}(?::[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4})*)?)::((?:[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}(?::[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4})*)?)$");
-+
-+
-+ private static boolean isIPAddress(final String hostname) {
-+ return hostname != null
-+ && (
-+ IPV4_PATTERN.matcher(hostname).matches()
-+ || IPV6_STD_PATTERN.matcher(hostname).matches()
-+ || IPV6_HEX_COMPRESSED_PATTERN.matcher(hostname).matches()
-+ );
-+
-+ }
-+
-+ private static boolean acceptableCountryWildcard(final String cn) {
-+ // The CN better have at least two dots if it wants wildcard action,
-+ // but can't be [*.co.uk] or [*.co.jp] or [*.org.uk], etc...
-+ // The [*.co.uk] problem is an interesting one. Should we just
-+ // hope that CA's would never foolishly allow such a
-+ // certificate to happen?
-+
-+ String[] parts = cn.split("\\.");
-+ // Only checks for 3 levels, with country code of 2 letters.
-+ if (parts.length > 3 || parts[parts.length - 1].length() != 2) {
-+ return true;
-+ }
-+ String countryCode = parts[parts.length - 2];
-+ return Arrays.binarySearch(BAD_COUNTRY_2LDS, countryCode) < 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ private static boolean matchesWildCard(final String cn,
-+ final String hostName) {
-+ String parts[] = cn.split("\\.");
-+ boolean match = false;
-+ String firstpart = parts[0];
-+ if (firstpart.length() > 1) {
-+ // server∗
-+ // e.g. server
-+ String prefix = firstpart.substring(0, firstpart.length() - 1);
-+ // skipwildcard part from cn
-+ String suffix = cn.substring(firstpart.length());
-+ // skip wildcard part from host
-+ String hostSuffix = hostName.substring(prefix.length());
-+ match = hostName.startsWith(prefix) && hostSuffix.endsWith(suffix);
-+ } else {
-+ match = hostName.endsWith(cn.substring(1));
-+ }
-+ if (match) {
-+ // I f we ’ r e i n s t r i c t mode ,
-+ // [ ∗.foo.com] is not allowed to match [a.b.foo.com]
-+ match = countDots(hostName) == countDots(cn);
-+ }
-+ return match;
-+ }
-+
-+ private static int countDots(final String data) {
-+ int dots = 0;
-+ for (int i = 0; i < data.length(); i++) {
-+ if (data.charAt(i) == '.') {
-+ dots += 1;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ return dots;
-+ }
-+
-+
-+ private static String getCN(X509Certificate cert) {
-+ // Note: toString() seems to do a better job than getName()
-+ //
-+ // For example, getName() gives me this:
-+ // 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=#16166a756c6975736461766965734063756362632e636f6d
-+ //
-+ // whereas toString() gives me this:
-+ // EMAILADDRESS=juliusdavies@cucbc.com
-+ String subjectPrincipal = cert.getSubjectX500Principal().toString();
-+
-+ return getCN(subjectPrincipal);
-+
-+ }
-+ private static String getCN(String subjectPrincipal) {
-+ StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(subjectPrincipal, ",");
-+ while(st.hasMoreTokens()) {
-+ String tok = st.nextToken().trim();
-+ if (tok.length() > 3) {
-+ if (tok.substring(0, 3).equalsIgnoreCase("CN=")) {
-+ return tok.substring(3);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-+ return null;
-+ }
-+
- }
diff -Nru axis-1.4/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3596.patch axis-1.4/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3596.patch
--- axis-1.4/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3596.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ axis-1.4/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3596.patch 2014-10-01 17:49:08.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+From: David Jorm and Arun Neelicattu (Red Hat Product Security)
+Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 19:38:17 +0000
+Subject: CVE-2014-3596
+
+The getCN function in Apache Axis 1.4 and earlier does not properly
+verify that the server hostname matches a domain name in the subject's
+Common Name (CN) or subjectAltName field of the X.509 certificate,
+which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof SSL servers via a
+certificate with a subject that specifies a common name in a field
+that is not the CN field. NOTE: this issue exists because of an
+incomplete fix for CVE-2012-5784.
+
+Forwarded: no
+Bug: https://bugs.debian.org/762444
+---
+ .../axis/components/net/JSSESocketFactory.java | 309 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 303 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/org/apache/axis/components/net/JSSESocketFactory.java b/src/org/apache/axis/components/net/JSSESocketFactory.java
+index dd3f991..abffcdd 100644
+--- a/src/org/apache/axis/components/net/JSSESocketFactory.java
++++ b/src/org/apache/axis/components/net/JSSESocketFactory.java
+@@ -15,12 +15,6 @@
+ */
+ package org.apache.axis.components.net;
+
+-import org.apache.axis.utils.Messages;
+-import org.apache.axis.utils.XMLUtils;
+-import org.apache.axis.utils.StringUtils;
+-
+-import javax.net.ssl.SSLSocket;
+-import javax.net.ssl.SSLSocketFactory;
+ import java.io.BufferedWriter;
+ import java.io.IOException;
+ import java.io.InputStream;
+@@ -28,7 +22,33 @@ import java.io.OutputStream;
+ import java.io.OutputStreamWriter;
+ import java.io.PrintWriter;
+ import java.net.Socket;
++import java.security.cert.Certificate;
++import java.security.cert.CertificateParsingException;
++import java.security.cert.X509Certificate;
++import java.util.ArrayList;
++import java.util.Arrays;
++import java.util.Collection;
+ import java.util.Hashtable;
++import java.util.Iterator;
++import java.util.LinkedList;
++import java.util.List;
++import java.util.Locale;
++import java.util.regex.Pattern;
++
++import javax.naming.InvalidNameException;
++import javax.naming.NamingException;
++import javax.naming.directory.Attribute;
++import javax.naming.directory.Attributes;
++import javax.naming.ldap.LdapName;
++import javax.naming.ldap.Rdn;
++import javax.net.ssl.SSLException;
++import javax.net.ssl.SSLSession;
++import javax.net.ssl.SSLSocket;
++import javax.net.ssl.SSLSocketFactory;
++
++import org.apache.axis.utils.Messages;
++import org.apache.axis.utils.StringUtils;
++import org.apache.axis.utils.XMLUtils;
+
+
+ /**
+@@ -41,6 +61,10 @@ import java.util.Hashtable;
+ */
+ public class JSSESocketFactory extends DefaultSocketFactory implements SecureSocketFactory {
+
++ // This is a a sorted list, if you insert new elements do it orderdered.
++ private final static String[] BAD_COUNTRY_2LDS =
++ {"ac", "co", "com", "ed", "edu", "go", "gouv", "gov", "info",
++ "lg", "ne", "net", "or", "org"};
+ /** Field sslFactory */
+ protected SSLSocketFactory sslFactory = null;
+
+@@ -187,6 +211,279 @@ public class JSSESocketFactory extends DefaultSocketFactory implements SecureSoc
+ if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
+ log.debug(Messages.getMessage("createdSSL00"));
+ }
++ verifyHostName(host, (SSLSocket) sslSocket);
+ return sslSocket;
+ }
++ /**
++ * Verifies that the given hostname in certicifate is the hostname we are trying to connect to.
++ * This resolves CVE-2012-5784 and CVE-2014-3596
++ * @param host
++ * @param ssl
++ * @throws IOException
++ */
++
++ private static void verifyHostName(String host, SSLSocket ssl)
++ throws IOException {
++ if (host == null) {
++ throw new IllegalArgumentException("host to verify was null");
++ }
++
++ SSLSession session = ssl.getSession();
++ if (session == null) {
++ // In our experience this only happens under IBM 1.4.x when
++ // spurious (unrelated) certificates show up in the server's chain.
++ // Hopefully this will unearth the real problem:
++ InputStream in = ssl.getInputStream();
++ in.available();
++ /*
++ If you're looking at the 2 lines of code above because you're
++ running into a problem, you probably have two options:
++
++ #1. Clean up the certificate chain that your server
++ is presenting (e.g. edit "/etc/apache2/server.crt" or
++ wherever it is your server's certificate chain is
++ defined).
++
++ OR
++
++ #2. Upgrade to an IBM 1.5.x or greater JVM, or switch to a
++ non-IBM JVM.
++ */
++
++ // If ssl.getInputStream().available() didn't cause an exception,
++ // maybe at least now the session is available?
++ session = ssl.getSession();
++ if (session == null) {
++ // If it's still null, probably a startHandshake() will
++ // unearth the real problem.
++ ssl.startHandshake();
++
++ // Okay, if we still haven't managed to cause an exception,
++ // might as well go for the NPE. Or maybe we're okay now?
++ session = ssl.getSession();
++ }
++ }
++
++ Certificate[] certs = session.getPeerCertificates();
++ verifyHostName(host.trim().toLowerCase(Locale.US), (X509Certificate) certs[0]);
++ }
++ /**
++ * Extract the names from the certificate and tests host matches one of them
++ * @param host
++ * @param cert
++ * @throws SSLException
++ */
++
++ private static void verifyHostName(final String host, X509Certificate cert)
++ throws SSLException {
++ // I'm okay with being case-insensitive when comparing the host we used
++ // to establish the socket to the hostname in the certificate.
++ // Don't trim the CN, though.
++
++ String[] cns = getCNs(cert);
++ String[] subjectAlts = getDNSSubjectAlts(cert);
++ verifyHostName(host, cns, subjectAlts);
++
++ }
++
++ /**
++ * Extract all alternative names from a certificate.
++ * @param cert
++ * @return
++ */
++ private static String[] getDNSSubjectAlts(X509Certificate cert) {
++ LinkedList subjectAltList = new LinkedList();
++ Collection c = null;
++ try {
++ c = cert.getSubjectAlternativeNames();
++ } catch (CertificateParsingException cpe) {
++ // Should probably log.debug() this?
++ cpe.printStackTrace();
++ }
++ if (c != null) {
++ Iterator it = c.iterator();
++ while (it.hasNext()) {
++ List list = (List) it.next();
++ int type = ((Integer) list.get(0)).intValue();
++ // If type is 2, then we've got a dNSName
++ if (type == 2) {
++ String s = (String) list.get(1);
++ subjectAltList.add(s);
++ }
++ }
++ }
++ if (!subjectAltList.isEmpty()) {
++ String[] subjectAlts = new String[subjectAltList.size()];
++ subjectAltList.toArray(subjectAlts);
++ return subjectAlts;
++ } else {
++ return new String[0];
++ }
++
++ }
++ /**
++ * Verifies
++ * @param host
++ * @param cn
++ * @param subjectAlts
++ * @throws SSLException
++ */
++
++ private static void verifyHostName(final String host, String[] cns, String[] subjectAlts)throws SSLException{
++ StringBuffer cnTested = new StringBuffer();
++
++ for (int i = 0; i < subjectAlts.length; i++){
++ String name = subjectAlts[i];
++ if (name != null) {
++ name = name.toLowerCase(Locale.US);
++ if (verifyHostName(host, name)){
++ return;
++ }
++ cnTested.append("/").append(name);
++ }
++ }
++ for (int i = 0; i < cns.length; i++) {
++ String cn = cns[i];
++ if (cn != null) {
++ cn = cn.toLowerCase(Locale.US);
++ if (verifyHostName(host, cn)) {
++ return;
++ }
++ cnTested.append("/").append(cn);
++ }
++ }
++ throw new SSLException("hostname in certificate didn't match: <"
++ + host + "> != <" + cnTested + ">");
++ }
++
++ private static boolean verifyHostName(final String host, final String cn){
++ if (doWildCard(cn) && !isIPAddress(host)) {
++ return matchesWildCard(cn, host);
++ }
++ return host.equalsIgnoreCase(cn);
++ }
++ private static boolean doWildCard(String cn) {
++ // Contains a wildcard
++ // wildcard in the first block
++ // not an ipaddress (ip addres must explicitily be equal)
++ // not using 2nd level common tld : ex: not for *.co.uk
++ String parts[] = cn.split("\\.");
++ return parts.length >= 3 &&
++ parts[0].endsWith("*") &&
++ acceptableCountryWildcard(cn) &&
++ !isIPAddress(cn);
++ }
++
++ private static final Pattern IPV4_PATTERN =
++ Pattern.compile("^(25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|[0-1]?\\d?\\d)(\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|[0-1]?\\d?\\d)){3}$");
++
++ private static final Pattern IPV6_STD_PATTERN =
++ Pattern.compile("^(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){7}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}$");
++
++ private static final Pattern IPV6_HEX_COMPRESSED_PATTERN =
++ Pattern.compile("^((?:[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}(?::[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4})*)?)::((?:[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}(?::[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4})*)?)$");
++
++
++ private static boolean isIPAddress(final String hostname) {
++ return hostname != null
++ && (
++ IPV4_PATTERN.matcher(hostname).matches()
++ || IPV6_STD_PATTERN.matcher(hostname).matches()
++ || IPV6_HEX_COMPRESSED_PATTERN.matcher(hostname).matches()
++ );
++
++ }
++
++ private static boolean acceptableCountryWildcard(final String cn) {
++ // The CN better have at least two dots if it wants wildcard action,
++ // but can't be [*.co.uk] or [*.co.jp] or [*.org.uk], etc...
++ // The [*.co.uk] problem is an interesting one. Should we just
++ // hope that CA's would never foolishly allow such a
++ // certificate to happen?
++
++ String[] parts = cn.split("\\.");
++ // Only checks for 3 levels, with country code of 2 letters.
++ if (parts.length > 3 || parts[parts.length - 1].length() != 2) {
++ return true;
++ }
++ String countryCode = parts[parts.length - 2];
++ return Arrays.binarySearch(BAD_COUNTRY_2LDS, countryCode) < 0;
++ }
++
++ private static boolean matchesWildCard(final String cn,
++ final String hostName) {
++ String parts[] = cn.split("\\.");
++ boolean match = false;
++ String firstpart = parts[0];
++ if (firstpart.length() > 1) {
++ // server∗
++ // e.g. server
++ String prefix = firstpart.substring(0, firstpart.length() - 1);
++ // skipwildcard part from cn
++ String suffix = cn.substring(firstpart.length());
++ // skip wildcard part from host
++ String hostSuffix = hostName.substring(prefix.length());
++ match = hostName.startsWith(prefix) && hostSuffix.endsWith(suffix);
++ } else {
++ match = hostName.endsWith(cn.substring(1));
++ }
++ if (match) {
++ // I f we ’ r e i n s t r i c t mode ,
++ // [ ∗.foo.com] is not allowed to match [a.b.foo.com]
++ match = countDots(hostName) == countDots(cn);
++ }
++ return match;
++ }
++
++ private static int countDots(final String data) {
++ int dots = 0;
++ for (int i = 0; i < data.length(); i++) {
++ if (data.charAt(i) == '.') {
++ dots += 1;
++ }
++ }
++ return dots;
++ }
++
++
++ private static String[] getCNs(X509Certificate cert) {
++ // Note: toString() seems to do a better job than getName()
++ //
++ // For example, getName() gives me this:
++ // 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=#16166a756c6975736461766965734063756362632e636f6d
++ //
++ // whereas toString() gives me this:
++ // EMAILADDRESS=juliusdavies@cucbc.com
++ String subjectPrincipal = cert.getSubjectX500Principal().toString();
++
++ return getCNs(subjectPrincipal);
++
++ }
++ private static String[] getCNs(String subjectPrincipal) {
++ if (subjectPrincipal == null) {
++ return null;
++ }
++ final List cns = new ArrayList();
++ try {
++ final LdapName subjectDN = new LdapName(subjectPrincipal);
++ final List rdns = subjectDN.getRdns();
++ for (int i = rdns.size() - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
++ final Rdn rds = (Rdn) rdns.get(i);
++ final Attributes attributes = rds.toAttributes();
++ final Attribute cn = attributes.get("cn");
++ if (cn != null) {
++ try {
++ final Object value = cn.get();
++ if (value != null) {
++ cns.add(value.toString());
++ }
++ }
++ catch (NamingException ignore) {}
++ }
++ }
++ }
++ catch (InvalidNameException ignore) { }
++ return cns.isEmpty() ? null : (String[]) cns.toArray(new String[ cns.size() ]);
++ }
++
+ }
diff -Nru axis-1.4/debian/patches/series axis-1.4/debian/patches/series
--- axis-1.4/debian/patches/series 2012-12-05 17:50:11.000000000 +0100
+++ axis-1.4/debian/patches/series 2014-10-01 17:49:08.000000000 +0200
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@
axis-bz152255.patch
javadoc.diff
add-osgi-metadata.patch
-06-fix-CVE-2012-5784.patch
+CVE-2014-3596.patch
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