I did find a mention of something similar to this problem in an IETF Internet-draft for proposed extensions to router advertisements at <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipv6-router-selection-02.tx
t>, although no solutions were offered: A malicious node could send Router Advertisement messages, specifying High Default Router Preference or carrying specific routes, with the effect of pulling traffic away from legitimate routers. However, a malicious node could easily achieve this same effect in other ways. For example, it could fabricate Router Advertisement messages with zero Router Lifetime from the other routers, causing hosts to stop using the other routes. Hence, this document has no new appreciable impact on Internet infrastructure security. Bill--On Wednesday, May 14, 2003 2:54 PM -0400 Anthony DeRobertis <asd@suespammers.org> wrote:
- Finally, a general question which perhaps isn't appropriate for this list, but I'm interested in the scope of the problem. One of the engineers who introduced a rogue router argued that allowing a router to confuse the IPv6 network with router advertisements is a major flaw in the protocol.A rogue DHCP server does the same thing. How's it different?