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Re: RFC: pam: dropping support for NIS/NIS+?



Hi,

在 2022-04-20星期三的 10:57 -0700,Steve Langasek写道:
> Hi folks,
> 
> As of glibc 2.32, upstream has split out RPC support; if you want RPC
> functionality, you now need to link against libtirpc instead, which is a
> superior, more featureful implementation.
> 
> This is a good thing architecturally, but one of the side effects for us is
> that, via PAM, we are now pulling a large number of crypto libraries into
> the transitively-essential set, because pam_unix links against libtirpc for
> NIS / NIS+ support.
> 
> Sam Hartman made a valiant attempt to make this an optional dynamic
> dependency, but ultimately abandoned the effort.
> 
> So I'd like to take a step back and challenge an underlying assumption by
> asking: do any of our users actually *need* this functionality?  The RPC
> functionality is only used for NIS and NIS+.  NIS is historically quite
> insecure, and I'm not aware of any efforts to improve its security (AFAIK
> the linkage of the crypto libraries doesn't fix the fundamentally insecure
> interfaces of NIS).  NIS+ is intended to be a more secure version of NIS,
> but to my knowledge there has never been a free implementation in the
> archive; this was a Sun-specific technology, which Sun deprecated two
> decades ago[1].
> 
> If we dropped support for NIS and NIS+ in the next Debian release, would
> anybody miss it?  Or has everyone moved on to LDAP / AD by now?

Before any discussion takes place, I would like to point out a previous
attempt of Fedora trying to get rid of NIS/NIS+ back in 2021. Please check out
the LWN article at https://lwn.net/Articles/874174/ , which would definitely
be helpful for the condition in Debian.

Thanks,
Boyuan Yang

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