Re: client-side signature checking of Debian archives
>>>>> Eugene V Lyubimkin <email@example.com> writes:
> I'm not sure that benefits outweigh the costs. HTTPS requires that
> I trust the third-parties – mirror provider and CA. Gpgv doesn't
> require third parties.
It does; you have to trust whatever source you’ve /initially/
got the public key from. Also, TLS does /not/ actually preclude
the user from comparing the remote’s key with a copy stored
locally. For Firefox/HTTPS, the respective functionality could
be found in the Certificate Patrol add-on , for instance.
> To me, that makes HTTPS (even with HPKP) principally weaker than
> offline medium-agnostic cryptographic content checks. Or I am wrong
> here, will the suggested HTTPS+HPKP+… scheme protect me from
> government players?
My understanding is that the suggestion being discussed is to
use TLS /alongside/ the usual Debian/APT signatures – not
instead of them; and the primary goal is to improve user’s
privacy. That is: only the mirror operator will remain
empowered to know the packages the user’s interested in.
(As opposed to: the operators of all the networks the APT HTTP
request passes through.)
My concerns would be along the lines of  (“Remember that all
mirror sites are donated to Debian: the hardware, […], and the
sysadmin work to keep it running.”) Specifically, a plain-HTTP
server is easier to configure and maintain. For one thing, when
your server does /not/ use TLS, you don’t need to be concerned
with the bugs and vulnerabilities of any TLS library whatsoever.
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