Re: use long keyid-format in gpg.conf (Re: Key collisions in the wild
Christian Seiler, on Wed 10 Aug 2016 15:37:43 +0200, wrote:
> On 08/10/2016 03:19 PM, Samuel Thibault wrote:
> > Ian Jackson, on Wed 10 Aug 2016 13:45:05 +0100, wrote:
> >> Adam D. Barratt writes ("Re: use long keyid-format in gpg.conf (Re: Key collisions in the wild"):
> >>> [explanation]
> >> Thanks.
> >> I don't know what side of this (one) line such a proposed gpg change
> >> falls. I still think it's unsatisfactory that our stable release has
> >> a default behaviour which cannot be used safely.
> > Well, I'd argue that 64bit IDs are not safe either, they have not been
> > made to be.
> Can we even consider key fingerprints safe in the long run?
Well, I'd say that in the end people *have* to cryptographically check
the signatures, and not trust fingerprints.
Thinking about it, I'd say we could even instead *shorten* the default
ID to 16bit, so that people will hopefully simply just not trust them at
all. For practical uses, 16bit hashing is enough to manage one's public