Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

[Steven Chamberlain <steven@pyro.eu.org>]

I agree it's not going to be portable in the near term, though there are
interesting changes being made and good code review happening.

Some dubious entropy sources were (only potentially?) used with
RAND_seed/add:

digests:
http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c.diff?r1=1.7;r2=1.8
private key:
http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c.diff?r1=1.2;r2=1.3

There is even a RAND_screen function on Win32 to use a screenshot of the
desktop as an entropy source.

I had a flashback to the Debian bug, and how uninitialised memory was
being used for that purpose.  They've ripped out this whole PRNG now to
use the one from their own libc:

http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c.diff?r1=1.14;r2=1.15

Regards,
-- 
Steven Chamberlain
steven@pyro.eu.org