Re: Updated SELinux Release
On Thu, 04 Nov 2004 23:06:06 -0500, Colin Walters <email@example.com> said:
> On Thu, 2004-11-04 at 13:15 +0000, Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote:
>> default: no.
> Why not on by default, with a targeted policy, for everyone?
> SELinux's flexibility allows one to easily turn it off for specific
> services. There's a lot of value in preventing a compromised or
> misconfigured syslogd or portmap daemon from destroying your system.
> Not to mention Apache; with the stronger version of can_network, the
> Slapper worm would have been stopped in its tracks (no outbound port
> 80 access). Additionally, I'm working on securing some high-risk
> software using the targeted policy; something that would be
> difficult to impossible to do without SELinux.
> The entire point of SELinux is to bring strong, flexible mandatory
> access control to a mainstream operating system (Linux). If it's
> not enabled by default, and limited to the few of us on this mailing
> list, what's the point? Why don't we just run say EROS
> (http://www.eros- os.org/) instead? A: Because what makes SELinux
> interesting is that it can run all of our legacy software. By not
> shipping it on everywhere, we're not tapping that ability.
This is all very nice, but I think we need to take an
evolutionary change to reach that goal. The first step, far more
palatable than forcing SELinux (even with just a targeted policy) is
to get SELinux in the default kernels, disabled by default at boot
Harp not on that string. William Shakespeare, "Henry VI"
Manoj Srivastava <firstname.lastname@example.org> <http://www.debian.org/%7Esrivasta/>
1024D/BF24424C print 4966 F272 D093 B493 410B 924B 21BA DABB BF24 424C