Re: Revival of the signed debs discussion
On Wed, Dec 03, 2003 at 06:43:18AM +0100, Goswin von Brederlow wrote:
> Matt Zimmerman <email@example.com> writes:
> > On Wed, Dec 03, 2003 at 03:07:17AM +0100, Goswin von Brederlow wrote:
> > > But this kind of tampering _can_ be checked by apt before installing
> > > the deb simply by adding a signature verifyer into the
> > > DPkg::Pre-Install-Pkgs config option, the same mechanism
> > > apt-listchanges already uses to display only the new section of the
> > > changelog.
> > Indeed, apt can do a lot better, and is very close to doing so. See #203741.
> The assumption was that the archive was compromised but the Release.gpg
> file changed and resigned.
Who was assuming this? At any rate, protecting the secret key is of course
the weakest link in any public key cryptosystem, and I don't see what that
has to do with apt.
> #203741 is about checking the
> Release.gpg chain of trust or is there more hidden in all the mails.
Yes, that is what it is about.
> Did the BTS reoder the mails, there don't seem to follow a locigal
> discussion. Haven't bothered to check the timestamps though.
Messages from discussions in other fora (including private mail) were later
copied to the BTS.