On Fri, Jan 21, 2000 at 06:42:53PM -0500, Greg Stark wrote: > If there were any actual security gains then it might make sense to disable > useful features for the security gains. As it is it merely downgrades a > hypothetical attack from a root-obtaining-exploit to a remote exploit that > doesn't obtain root but is a DOS and obtains non-root access to the machine. Every little bit helps. I'd rather have users who can't figure out why their bind isn't working (in which case they probably shouldn't be running bind) than users getting hit by a trivial root exploit. > If you want to improve security you should implement a kernel interface for > non-root users to be able to do what named does. Then propose this again. I'd love to see bind running chroot'ed also. But that requires more than a simple change to the init script; let's go one step at a time. -- Mike Stone
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