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Re: Migrating to GPG - A mini-HOWTO

On Tue, 14 Sep 1999, Martin Schulze wrote:

> > Nono, the new key must have a signature on it from the old RSA key (this
> > is posisble) then you can send it in a signed message to the keyring
> > people. Otherwise our web of trust is totally trashed, very bad.
> Nono!  The new key does not need to have a signature from the old pgp
> key on it.  You can still create a new web of trust and only use the
> new key.  You do not have to "mess" around with the rsa module.  This
> is an option, not a must.

But we decided that we do not -want- to create a new web of trust, it is
too much work and totally unnecessary. The RSA patent expires in 11
months, it is wastefull to throw everything away now.

Either the keysignings are a purely pointless excercise and we don't care
about a web of trust, or they have meaning and should be preserved
whenever possible.

> > However, everyone should be -using- gpg with their old PGP 2.x key.
> I disagree.  The rsa module has patent problems.  It should not be
> used.  If people want to use it that's fine.

Aside from the contradiction in that sentance.. I hope you are not saying
that people should use PGP 2.x over GPG+RSA/RSAREF if they have the
choice. It should be clear - if you want to stick with your PGP 2.x key
and/or process signatures from PGP 2.x keys you should be using GPG.

If you choose to use GPG without one of the RSA modules then you should
generally NOT be using PGP 2.x to continue processing RSA
signatures/messages - quite simply this will not work with signatures
generated by developers using GPG+RSA.

Debian's position should pretty much summarised by the following items:
  1) Use of PGP of any version is strongly discouraged, particularly PGP
  2) Creation of new PGP2.x keys is strongly discouraged
  3) The use of IDEA or any other patented algorithm for encrypted emails
     is discouraged [largely unimportant, encryption stuff is minor]
  4) Maintaing our web of trust is important. New keys should be
     always be signed by older keys - where possible.
  5) The continued use of PGP 2.x keys will be supported for the
     forseeable future, however they are considered to be 'legacy' items.
  6) New keys should not be created using ANY patented algorithms. No
     new patented algorithms [public key, digest or symetric] will ever be
     supported by Debian.
  7) Signing new keys based on a signed email from the key holder is
     strongly discouraged. Face-to-Face verification before any key
     signature is strongly encouraged.
  8) Participants of 'signing parties' are encouraged to use OpenPGP keys
     (remember that a PGP 2.x key cannot be signed by an OpenPGP key
  9) Cryptographic material [signatures, keys, rings, etc] should be in
     OpenPGP format whenever possible.

That is the basic outline of the transition plan we have been discussing
on and off for months.

[Incidently if there is no big disagreement to the above 9 points I will
make a posting to devel-announce with this as official word]


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