On Mon, Apr 20, 1998 at 01:20:10PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:
> We should modify our libc so that opening a file in /tmp or /var/tmp -
> determined by simple string comparison of the filename passed to
> open(2) - fails if O_CREAT is specified without O_EXCL.
This should only be files directly under /tmp or /var/tmp, not in
subdirectories, right? (otherwise using mkdir /tmp/prog.$$ instead of
just >/tmp/prog.$$ doesn't fix the /tmp security holes).
This also would make most uses of tar and similar in /tmp and /var/tmp
work okay, I believe.
Yes?
Cheers,
aj
--
Anthony Towns <aj@humbug.org.au> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/>
I don't speak for anyone save myself. PGP encrypted mail preferred.
``It's not a vision, or a fear. It's just a thought.''
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