Draft GR for supermajority fix

[Ian Jackson <ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk>]

Again, would be followed by my clause 2 re amendments.

=== TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===

1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in
   4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following
   General Resolution:

   ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----

   Constitutional Amendment- TC Supermajority Fix

   Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical
   Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1.

   Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a
   fencepost error.  In the new text a supermajority requirement is met
   only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly
   greater than the supermajority ratio.

   In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a
   developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single
   dissenter.  And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two
   dissenters could be overruled by all 6 remaining members; now that
   is no longer possible.

   This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent
   of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.

   Therefore, in the Debian Constitution amend A.6(3) as follows:

       3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default
          option by its required majority ratio is dropped from
          consideration.
           1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
              who prefer option A over option B.
    -      2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
    -         ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
    -      3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
    -         ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
    +      2. An option A defeats the default option D by its
    +         required majority ratio if:
    +          (a) V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A); and
    +          (b) if a supermajority of N:M is required for A,
    +              M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to N * V(D,A).

   The effect is to fix the fencepost bug.  A 1:1 vote will need
   strictly more in favour than against, but an N:1 vote will need only
   exactly N:1.  This will also have a (neglible) effect on any General
   Resolutions requiring supermajorities.

   For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any
   votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical
   Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.

   ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----