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Re: [Debconf-team] DebConf governance (Re: About the DC15 entity and authority (was: DebConf 15 Legal Entity)



On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 10:14:02PM +0200, martin f krafft wrote:
> also sprach Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org> [2014-04-17 21:35 +0200]:

> >    Put differently: if someone needs a local non-profit for
> >    DebConf, this non-profit must conform to the rules for a Debian
> >    TO.

> I've argued against this in my previous mail. I have since learnt
> that the TO guidelines are just guidelines and could probably be
> amended to be useful in the context of temporary DC legal entities.

Perhaps I'm painting with too broad of strokes and should double-check the
actual TO guidelines.

> However, I still struggle to understand how, having just been
> selected to organise DebConf, which requires a whole lot of trust,
> we should now prove that we are trustworthy?

I didn't speak of trustworthiness.  I am speaking of governance.

The problem that Holger posed was that, in the past, a local team has said
"the board [of our local non-profit] has the final say".  This is wrong.
Authority in all matters of Debian money flows from the Debian Developers,
to the DPL, to the DPL's delegates.  It is altogether inappropriate for a
DebConf-related local non-profit to suggest otherwise, and the DPL should
not allow funds to be given in Debian's name to any organization that
doesn't understand and agree with this.

Now, I think the structure of the actual DebConf delegation is a poor one
and contributes to a lot of problems year after year for DebConf
organization.  But that means we should fix the structure of the DebConf
delegation, *not* bypass it.

I am not concerned that you as a DebConf15 organizer are going to take our
money and run.  I am not concerned that *I* as a DebConf14 organizer am
going to do this, either.  I trust both of us not to work against Debian's
interests in this way when organizing the conference.  But precedents, and
governance, are important; and while I agree with you that the normal Debian
*decision-making processes* are too discussion-oriented to work for the
time-based conference organization, this does not mean that the DebConf team
should be allowed to exist outside Debian's *governance* structures.  In
other years, we have had (and will have again) local teams that are not as
attuned to the Debian/DebConf way, and we should not be setting precedent
that these teams can take autonomous decisions that are not answerable to
the Debian project.

> >  - The consequence is that the board of the TO does *not* have the
> >  final say on decisions of how to spend Debian's money, because in
> >  all transactions involving Debian assets they are acting as
> >  agents of Debian, answerable to its normal decision-making
> >  processes.  They *also* have a responsibility to make sure the
> >  uses are legal and responsible ones according to their own
> >  charter, but that means they have veto power, not autonomy.

> I vehemently disagree with this. The normal decision-making
> processes of Debian do not work for real-time, real-life, real-money
> decisions. This does not mean that we should try to make use of e.g.
> consensus-based decision making as we know it from Debian whenever
> possible. It just means that there will be situations when this
> won't work.

In fact, I think that consensus-based decision-making is entirely the wrong
model for organizing a conference, and that is not at all what I am
advocating for.  I only want it clear that all decisions made by the local
org are by their nature provisional and *can* be overturned by the DPL.

If everyone agrees with this principle, there should be no problem in
practice; the very presence of such a principle guides people to frame their
decisions correctly so that there's no need for overrides.

> Obviously, the board of the TO^W^W^W^W local team (however they
> chose to organise themselves, which might well depend very much on
> the country) is answerable to Debian. However, once their budget
> plan is approved, they are now in the front seat, and it would be
> a nightmare if they couldn't make executive decisions within the
> limit of their budget.

We are in agreement regarding the need for executive decision making.  My
point is that it is not actually "obvious" that the board is answerable to
Debian.  I am looking for assurance that this is actually the case in
practice.

> And in the case of DebConf, where the local team knows the venue and
> has been talking to the people on site, it should be empowered to
> make decisions as required, if they are in accordance with a budget
> that's been signed off.

Do you think that the local team should have the authority to sign contracts
with the venue without review from the DPL or their delegates, on the
grounds that the contracts fit within the budget limits?

> > I don't know if this concept of DC15 being a fiduciary of Debian
> > is captured accurately in its setup (bylaws or otherwise), but if
> > it's not, that should be fixed.

> I disagree. We serve to organise DebConf. We have not come together
> to form a fiduciary of Debian, at least not in the legal/financial
> meaning of the word.

> Obviously, organising DebConf means staying true to the spirit of
> Debian (and DebConf), and every single one on our team will bow to
> that.

> But it does not mean that we're willing to stand out there,
> negotiate with the real world without knowing that we have (a) the
> powers to make decisions that are necessary to be made for the
> conference we are organising, and (b) the entire team behind us,
> because after all, you selected us to organise this conference,
> which requires a level of trust.

Not being a fiduciary exactly allows for the problem discussed before, that
the board may believe they have the final decision-making authority and the
DPL cannot override them.  I do not accept this.

Maybe we are talking past each other here and you have a different
understanding of "fiduciary" than I do.  I certainly don't mean that the
local team should suffer from its decisions being constantly reviewed and
questioned by the rest of the team, only that the local team should be
accountable to Debian for their decisions - which it seems that you and I
agree with in principle, even if we're using different words.  I hope this
response helps to clarify my position.

-- 
Steve Langasek                   Give me a lever long enough and a Free OS
Debian Developer                   to set it on, and I can move the world.
Ubuntu Developer                                    http://www.debian.org/
slangasek@ubuntu.com                                     vorlon@debian.org

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