Hi, Buddha Buck: > non-Amendment GR passes if it is the CpSSD winner, but an Amendment is > required to be the Condorcet winner (vote to be held again, after a > discussion period, if an Amendment is the CpSSD winner but not the > Condorcet winner), is that a supermajority procedure? It is definitely > a non-neutral procedure). > It's not even a majority requirement, if we define "majority" by the conventional "more than half of the voters rank this choice first". For a trivial example, consider a vote split three-ways between - cabd - badc - dacb Run it through Condorcet: A is unbeaten, thus the winner. The "Condorcet winner" idea is interesting, but I don't know ... > On the otherhand, it might also short circuit debate and compromise, > since there is less impetus to convince people of your version over > another before the ballot is drawn up. IMHO, the non-requirement to convince "enough" people to rank "my" pet choice first can equally well result in a less hot-headed debate. All you need to do, under Condorcet, is to convince enough people that your favorite choice is "acceptable enough", after all. > Actually, it is stronger evidence against McGann's thesis, that majority > rule provides the best protection for the minority. Personally, I don't think that thesis is true _at_all_. -- Matthias Urlichs | noris network AG | http://smurf.noris.de/
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