Bug#637001: allow xterm to run a user-specified command on some event (e.g. to open a URL)
On 2011-08-09 07:00:32 -0400, Thomas Dickey wrote:
> It falls into the same category as the other "allow" items -
> something where there's a potential for outsiders (e.g.,
> send-events) to manipulate it.
Not really. Events sent by process output to the terminal should
be disabled, whether or not the run-command is implemented. As
I've said, a middle-click (which does a paste) is already dangerous
enough.
What I'm saying is that
Meta <Btn1Up>: run-command(...)
wouldn't be more dangerous than the standard
~Ctrl ~Meta <Btn2Up>: insert-selection(SELECT, CUT_BUFFER0)
if the command itself doesn't contain a security hole.
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Vincent Lefèvre <vincent@vinc17.net> - Web: <http://www.vinc17.net/>
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