Re: [RFC] General Resolution to deploy tag2upload

[Ian Jackson <ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk>]

Sean Whitton writes ("Re: [RFC] General Resolution to deploy tag2upload"):
>[Joerg Jaspert wrote:]
>> Actually, we can set acls on fingerprints and then that key wont be able
>> to upload anymore. That is not something recorded in the keyrings or the
>> DM list. Obviously that is not something used often (really really
>> seldom), it is more for "this key is compromised badly, please turn off
>> anything with it *NOW*" situations, which it's what Helmut meant with the
>> urgent cases.
[and]
>> *Really* seldom. I would have to dig and see when, especially for the
>> timing thing with keyring team.
> 
> Thanks.  Then possibly it is sufficient for ftpmaster just to disable
> tag2upload's whole key until the keyring update is pushed.

I'm not sure this is a sufficient answer.  We don't want uploads by
revoked keys to appear on *.dgit.d.o either.

Joerg, is there some way that this fingerprint block information could
be made available in a more timely manner?  Ideally we would update
push.dgit.d.o to use this information, regardless of tag2upload.
(And the t2u conversion system should use it too.)

I think maybe we should take this to a different venue, than this
thread on -vote.  How about a bug against ftp.d.o and/or
dgit-infrastructure ?

Thanks,
Ian.

-- 
Ian Jackson <ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk>   These opinions are my own.  

Pronouns: they/he.  If I emailed you from @fyvzl.net or @evade.org.uk,
that is a private address which bypasses my fierce spamfilter.