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Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering



Le jeudi, 27 août 2015, 10.04:50 Stefano Zacchiroli a écrit :
> On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 10:12:41PM +0200, Andreas Barth wrote:
> > we (as the Technical Committee) have encountered two bugs in the
> > constitution which we like to fix. For this reason, I propose the
> > following General Resolution to change the constitution.
> 
> Can we have a diff and a word-diff please? That would help a lot in
> better reviewing the proposal.

They're hereby attached, I've pushed the git repository that I've used 
for creating these there too:

http://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/users/odyx/supermajority-GR.git/

Andreas, it would make sense to confirm that this is your understanding 
of the GR proposal. In particular, I was puzzled when trying to 
interpret:

>    (i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority
>    by dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically:
>    - Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph
>      A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
>    - Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely, leaving A.6(2) to be
>      followed by A.6(4).

Cheers,
OdyX
diff --git a/constitution.txt b/constitution.txt
index 6204fbe..4b9b499 100644
--- a/constitution.txt
+++ b/constitution.txt
@@ -86,7 +86,9 @@
     3. Make or override any decision authorised by the powers of the
        Project Leader or a Delegate.
     4. Make or override any decision authorised by the powers of the
-       Technical Committee, provided they agree with a 2:1 majority.
+       Technical Committee, provided they agree with a 2:1 majority;
+       failing that, the prospective winning resolution text becomes a
+       non-binding statement of opinion.
     5. Issue, supersede and withdraw nontechnical policy documents and
        statements.
        These include documents describing the goals of the project, its
@@ -260,10 +262,11 @@
     4. Overrule a Developer (requires a 3:1 majority).
        The Technical Committee may ask a Developer to take a particular
        technical course of action even if the Developer does not wish to;
-       this requires a 3:1 majority. For example, the Committee may
-       determine that a complaint made by the submitter of a bug is
-       justified and that the submitter's proposed solution should be
-       implemented.
+       this requires a 3:1 majority; failing that, the prospective winning
+       resolution text becomes a non-binding statement of opinion. For
+       example, the Committee may determine that a complaint made by the
+       submitter of a bug is a justified and that the submitter's proposed
+       solution should be implemented.
     5. Offer advice.
        The Technical Committee may make formal announcements about its
        views on any matter. Individual members may of course make informal
@@ -477,7 +480,7 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
    These rules apply to communal decision-making by committees and
    plebiscites, where stated above.
 
-  A.1. Proposal
+  A.0. Proposal
 
    The formal procedure begins when a draft resolution is proposed and
    sponsored, as required.
@@ -531,8 +534,6 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
        ballot that includes an option for the original resolution, each
        amendment, and the default option (where applicable).
     2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
-       Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
-       have a 1:1 majority requirement.
     3. The votes are counted according to the rules in A.6. The default
        option is "Further Discussion", unless specified otherwise.
     4. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters of
@@ -573,14 +574,8 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
     2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other than the
        default option which do not receive at least R votes ranking that
        option above the default option are dropped from consideration.
-    3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option
-       by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
-         1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters who
-            prefer option A over option B.
-         2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority ratio
-            N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
-         3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
-            ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
+    3. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters who
+       prefer option A over option B.
     4. From the list of undropped options, we generate a list of pairwise
        defeats.
          1. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictly greater
@@ -602,10 +597,22 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
             equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than V(Y,B).
          2. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat weaker
             than it. There may be more than one such defeat.
-    8. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner is
-       chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is only one
-       such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple options, the
-       elector with the casting vote chooses which of those options wins.
+    8. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the
+       prospective winner is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set.
+       If there is only one such option, it is the prospective winner. If
+       there are multiple options, the elector with the casting vote
+       chooses which of those options is the prospective winner. If there
+       is no elector with a casting vote, the default option wins.
+    9. 1. If the prospective winner W has no majority requirement,
+          or defeats the default option D by its majority
+          requirement, the prospective winner is the actual winner.
+       2. Otherwise, the motion has failed its supermajority with
+          the consequences set out alongside the majority
+          requirement (or, if unspecified, the default option
+          wins).
+       3. An option A defeats the default option D by a
+          majority of N:M if M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to
+          N * V(D,A).
 
    Note: Options which the voters rank above the default option are
    options they find acceptable. Options ranked below the default options
diff --git a/constitution.txt b/constitution.txt
index 6204fbe..4b9b499 100644
--- a/constitution.txt
+++ b/constitution.txt
@@ -86,7 +86,9 @@
    3. Make or override any decision authorised by the powers of the
       Project Leader or a Delegate.
    4. Make or override any decision authorised by the powers of the
       Technical Committee, provided they agree with a 2:1 [-majority.-]{+majority;+}
{+       failing that, the prospective winning resolution text becomes a+}
{+       non-binding statement of opinion.+}
    5. Issue, supersede and withdraw nontechnical policy documents and
       statements.
       These include documents describing the goals of the project, its
@@ -260,10 +262,11 @@
    4. Overrule a Developer (requires a 3:1 majority).
       The Technical Committee may ask a Developer to take a particular
       technical course of action even if the Developer does not wish to;
       this requires a 3:1 [-majority.-]{+majority; failing that, the prospective winning+}
{+       resolution text becomes a non-binding statement of opinion.+} For
       example, the Committee may determine that a complaint made by the
       submitter of a bug is {+a+} justified and that the submitter's proposed
       solution should be implemented.
    5. Offer advice.
       The Technical Committee may make formal announcements about its
       views on any matter. Individual members may of course make informal
@@ -477,7 +480,7 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
   These rules apply to communal decision-making by committees and
   plebiscites, where stated above.

  [-A.1.-]{+A.0.+} Proposal

   The formal procedure begins when a draft resolution is proposed and
   sponsored, as required.
@@ -531,8 +534,6 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
       ballot that includes an option for the original resolution, each
       amendment, and the default option (where applicable).
    2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
[-       Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement-]
[-       have a 1:1 majority requirement.-]
    3. The votes are counted according to the rules in A.6. The default
       option is "Further Discussion", unless specified otherwise.
    4. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters of
@@ -573,14 +574,8 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
    2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other than the
       default option which do not receive at least R votes ranking that
       option above the default option are dropped from consideration.
    3.[-Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option-]
[-       by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.-]
[-         1.-] Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters who
       prefer option A over option B.[-2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority ratio-]
[-            N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).-]
[-         3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority-]
[-            ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.-]
    4. From the list of undropped options, we generate a list of pairwise
       defeats.
         1. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictly greater
@@ -602,10 +597,22 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
            equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than V(Y,B).
         2. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat weaker
            than it. There may be more than one such defeat.
    8. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the
       {+prospective+} winner is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set.
       If there is only one such option, it is the {+prospective+} winner. If
       there are multiple options, the elector with the casting vote
       chooses which of those options {+is the prospective winner. If there+}
{+       is no elector with a casting vote, the default option+} wins.
    {+9. 1. If the prospective winner W has no majority requirement,+}
{+          or defeats the default option D by its majority+}
{+          requirement, the prospective winner is the actual winner.+}
{+       2. Otherwise, the motion has failed its supermajority with+}
{+          the consequences set out alongside the majority+}
{+          requirement (or, if unspecified, the default option+}
{+          wins).+}
{+       3. An option A defeats the default option D by a+}
{+          majority of N:M if M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to+}
{+          N * V(D,A).+}

   Note: Options which the voters rank above the default option are
   options they find acceptable. Options ranked below the default options

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