I second both parts of the GR below. Andreas Barth <aba@ayous.org> writes: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Hi together, > > we (as the Technical Committee) have encountered two bugs in the > constitution which we like to fix. For this reason, I propose the following > General Resolution to change the constitution. > > Please note that we put both issues into one GR proposal; however, if we > notice one of the issues generates too much discussion, we will separate > the proposals. > > > > Regards, > Andi > > ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS ----- > > > Constitutional Amendment: TC Supermajority Fix > > Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical > Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1. > > Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a > fencepost error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met > only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly > greater than the supermajority ratio. > > In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a > developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single > dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two > dissenters could be outvoted by all 6 remaining members; now that > is no longer possible. > > This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent > of the Constitution, and is unhelpful. > > Additionally, following discussion of the supermajority mechanism > within the project, it was realised that certain situations could > cause anomalous results: > > * The existing rules might result in a GR or TC resolution passing > which was actually the diametric opposite of the majority view. > > * The existing rules unintentionally privilege the default option > in evenly contested TC votes where no supermajority is required, > possibly encouraging tactical voting. > > Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows: > > (i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority > by dropping options at an early stage). Specifically: > - Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph > A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1). > - Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely, leaving A.6(2) to be > followed by A.6(4). > > (ii) In A.6(8) replace all occurrences of "winner" with > "prospective winner". Replace "wins" in "which of those options > wins" with "is the prospective winner". > > (iii) In A.6(8) add a new sentence at the end: > + If there is no elector with a casting vote, the default option > + wins. > > (iv) Add a new section A.6(9) after A.6(8): > + 9. 1. If the prospective winner W has no majority requirement, > + or defeats the default option D by its majority > + requirement, the prospective winner is the actual winner. > + 2. Otherwise, the motion has failed its supermajority with > + the consequences set out alongside the majority > + requirement (or, if unspecified, the default option > + wins). > + 3. An option A defeats the default option D by a > + majority of N:M if M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to > + N * V(D,A). > > (v) In > * 6.1(4) (Technical Commitee power to overrule a Developer) > * 4.1(4) (Developers' use of TC powers by GR) (if another > constitutional amendment has not abolished that > supermajority requirement) > in each case after the "N:M majority" add > + ; failing that, the prospective winning resolution text becomes > + a non-binding statement of opinion. > > (vi) In A.3(2) delete as follows: > 2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements. > - Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement > - have a 1:1 majority requirement. > > For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any > votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical > Committee) in progress at the time the change is made. > > The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and arrange that failing a > supermajority voids the whole decision (or makes it advisory), > rather than promoting another option. The fencepost bugfix will > also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions > requiring supermajorities. And after this change the TC chair can > choose a non-default option even if it is tied with a default > option. > > > > > > Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering. > > The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1. > This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is > undesirable. > > Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment: > > - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0. > > > ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS ----- > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1 > > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJV3h0PAAoJENrvwFpthGSOgRIH/iHtX2bvWjRabw58huFsgaVn > MX0D3JPXZlaPv9b8doerfuhQQc4MJHEhqDyz4Bd93L2tzHfs/ZYqSVOlEQC1JalJ > 7/ZV7Qyr9QNRtU6RMP0v5F3PoDpZGn454V4bKiaqcwsvM/WAzPxHZPsyy1lkqfeS > GS+cGORdMmt3vKVze36ZeOK1hMMpHvpG61noepQtvVkIV2uKG/XLfxLCSP0J+fMH > y/idIuxeeyCOpij3YDdzUZcj3csOgDn5GaTSWxUkS2zTulMGpczek2I4CTxJyIMT > CQuP6Z2hRzQ3if6L2/XViLd0jVCrddYuCZlE0LsBs1zEPxKqQD3xW1CB2/rmWSo= > =LOrV > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -- |)| Philip Hands [+44 (0)20 8530 9560] HANDS.COM Ltd. |-| http://www.hands.com/ http://ftp.uk.debian.org/ |(| Hugo-Klemm-Strasse 34, 21075 Hamburg, GERMANY
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