Re: Amendment to GR on GFDL, and the changes to the Social Contract
Christopher Martin <chrsmrtn@debian.org> writes:
>> > But why does the Secretary get to decide whether this barrier should be
>> > set or not? You can't say "the developers have the right to interpret
>> > the DFSG, not the Secretary; the Secretary only gets to arbitrarily
>> > decide to make the passage of some amendments far more difficult than
>> > for others because of his or her own contrary interpretation of the
>> > DFSG, at his or her personal whim." That's obviously ludicrous.
>>
>> So you think that Manoj's opinion was on the basis of personal whim?
>
> It was his personal judgment. I'm sure he thought about it carefully, but
> that's irrelevant. It's still not (as I've argued elsewhere) his power to
> do so, however carefully.
The phrase you used was "personal whim."
Whose judgment should he use instead?
He may interpret the Constitution to require that implicit
modifications of Foundation Documents require 3:1 just as explicit
ones do. This is hardly a radical stretch.
And, he must determine for every resolution whether it is a
modification of a Foundation Document. He cannot shirk this
responsibility; he must determine, and then issue the ballot.
If he issues a ballot that says "this requires a majority" when it
works a modification of a Foundation Document, then he has been remiss
in his duties. He has indeed then violated the Constitution. There
is no way for him to "not decide", which seems to be what you think he
should do.
> Perhaps you missed the part where I pointed out that the DFSG is not part of
> the constitution.
Read the above, please.
> No, the Secretary is not obligated to do so, as I've explained in previous
> posts. He/she is not at all obligated to make a judgment. It is not their
> job to ensure a "proper ballot" if ensuring a proper ballot would require
> them to overstep their authority by engaging in personal DFSG
> interpretation.
The Constitution is silent on who interprets the DFSG. It follows
that it is the job of every developer in the course of their duties to
do so to the best of their ability. In no way have I suggested that
Manoj's interpretation of the DFSG should control ftpmaster, for
example. It controls his execution of his duties, and nothing more.
But also, nothing less.
Issuing the ballot with a majority requirement when, in his opinion,
the resolution effects a change to the DFSG, is a violation of the
Constitution.
> The ftpmasters should, in theory at least, follow the decisions of the
> Project as to what should be in main. They would also be overstepping their
> authority if they started rejecting packages under the GPL because they
> decided that they didn't like it anymore, since longstanding consensus
> allows the GPL (though this could be reversed by a vote).
It is however ultimately *their* determination. Yes, they should
attend to consensus. But they are not beholden to it.
I would note that Manoj explicitly requested comment here. He was
(and I presume, is) quite happy to receive people's opinions about the
proper form of the ballot.
> The Secretary should also follow the directives, standard interpretations,
> etc. of the Project, but when it is precisely an issue of interpretation
> that is at hand, they should refuse to inject their own views by setting
> 3:1 supermajorities, and let the developers decide the matter. To impose a
> 3:1 supermajority would be to presuppose the very issue being voted upon.
It is the *Constitution* which imposes the 3:1 requirement on changes
to the Foundation Documents. It is the Secretary's job to give effect
to that provision by creating correct ballots.
If I propose a resolution that says "This resolution is not a
recission or modification of a Foundation Document. The text of the
DFSG shall remain intact just as is. The main Debian archive may now
include any software which it is legally permitted to distribute,
whether it passes the tests of the DFSG or not," are you seriously
saying that such a resolution requires only a majority vote?
> Yes, but we shouldn't have to do that, since the Secretary should refuse to
> interpret the DFSG in the first place and let the developers themselves
> decide what to think. We don't need to be protected from ourselves.
How can he refuse? If he refuses to interpret it, then he cannot
assign the correct victory margin *AT ALL*. If he says "this requires
a majority" then that *is* a determination that the resolution does
not modify the DFSG. He cannot avoid making that determination.
> No, he's refused to judge on the matter, and refused to shape the vote and
> prejudge the issue. Not at all the same as endorsing the acceptability of
> the proposal.
How can he say "because this does not change the DFSG, it requires a
majority" without making a judgment that it does not change the DFSG?
Thomas
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