On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 09:48:36PM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote: > Raul Miller said: > >Which makes at least some sense: only 19 people actively approved of A, > >while 20 actively approved of B. Granted, this mechanism only kicks in > >for votes with very low turnout or where significant numbers of people > >don't actively approve of options, but I'm not convinced that this > >example shows that the mechanism is flawed. > Yep. But of the 20 who actively approved of B, 19 prefered A. > Meanwhile, nobody actively opposed A, but 19 people actively opposed B. So we should always feel free to enact changes based not on the presence of active support for them, but on the absence of active opposition to them? Then why have a quorum requirement of any kind? The examples presented make a very clear case that the per-option quorum system can in some cases result in a different option winning than in the case of pure Condorcet. But you really haven't made a very clear case for why this is a *bad* thing in the bizarre scenarios you've laid out. In particular, why would a group of 19 informed voters, *knowing* that a vote of A=DB would not count towards quorum for option A, vote in such an irrational manner if they actually believe A is acceptable? To me, weighing A equally with the default option (i.e., 'more discussion') doesn't tell me that it's a vote for A at all, particularly if these quorum rules are enacted; so why should it count in A's favor? > Choosing B is a good way to start flame wars. Choosing A is a good way > not to. Choosing D is a good way to come up with a better option. > Which is chosen? We've been around the block a few too many times to believe that *any* election method would actually succeed in avoiding flame wars. ;) -- Steve Langasek postmodern programmer
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