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Re: Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote tallying



I second this resolution, and am attaching the full text below.

Simon

On Fri, May 16, 2003 at 12:42:59PM -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
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> Hi folks,
> 
> 	This GR was first broached on December 14th, 18th and 19th,
>  2000, by Raul Miller. A election methods committee was set up to
>  examine the issue and come up with recommendations, and a cast of
>  characters got together to put this final form in place.  The
>  discussion was revived on Aug 21st, 2002, where the recommendations
>  of the committee were further refined (espescially adding the super
>  majority mechanisms) by people on this mailing list. 
> 
> 	I would like to thank, in particular, Raul Miller, Mike
>  Ossipoff, Norman Petry,  Anthony Towns, Buddha Buck, Jochen Voss, and
>  several other contributors from the mailing list who helped this
>  along. I apologize to the people whose name I haven't mentioned; lack
>  of space prohibits me from expresseing my appreciation adequately. 
> 
> 	I am formally proposing that we adopt this resolution be
>  adopted, and I am asking for seconds for this resolution; we need at
>  least 5 other developers to second this for this to go anywhere. 
> 
> ======================================================================
> 
>                     PROPOSAL
> ______________________________________________________________________
> 
>  Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD  vote tallying:
> ______________________________________________________________________
> 
> 
> Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
> election], change item 3 to read:
> 
>     3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes, tallies, and
>        results are not revealed during the voting period; after the
>        vote the Project Secretary lists all the votes cast. The voting
>        period is 2 weeks, but may be varied by up to 1 week by the
>        Project Leader.
> 
> ______________________________________________________________________
> 
> Under 5.2 Appointment of project leader, change item 7 to read:
> 
>     7. The decision will be made using the method specified in section
>        A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.  The quorum is the
>        same as for a General Resolution (s.4.2) and the default
>        option is "None Of The Above".
> 
> ______________________________________________________________________
> 
> Under 6.1 Powers [of the technical committee], change item 7 to read:
> 
>     7. Appoint the Chairman of the Technical Committee.  The Chairman
>        is elected by the Committee from its members. All members of
>        the committee are automatically nominated; the committee votes
>        starting one week before the post will become vacant (or
>        immediately, if it is already too late). The members may vote
>        by public acclamation for any fellow committee member,
>        including themselves; there is no default option. The vote
>        finishes when all the members have voted, or when the voting
>        period has ended. The result is determined using the method
>        specified in section A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.
> 
> ______________________________________________________________________
> 
> Under A.2 Calling for a vote, change items 2 and 4 to read
> 
>     2. The proposer or any sponsor of a resolution may call for a vote on that
>        resolution and all related amendments.
>     4. The minimum discussion period is counted from the time the last
>        formal amendment was accepted, or since the whole resolution
>        was proposed if no amendments have been proposed and accepted.
> 
> ______________________________________________________________________
> 
> Replace A.3 with:
> 
>   A.3. Voting procedure
> 
>     1. Each resolution and its related amendments is voted on in a
>        single ballot that includes an option for the original
>        resolution, each amendment, and the default option (where
>        applicable).
>     2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
>        Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
>        have a 1:1 majority requirement.
>     3. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6.  The
>        default option is "Further Discussion", unless specified
>        otherwise.
>     4. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
>        of procedure.
> 
> ______________________________________________________________________
> 
> Replace A.5 with:
> 
>   A.5. Expiry
> 
>    If a proposed resolution has not been discussed, amended, voted on or
>    otherwise dealt with for 4 weeks the secretary may issue a statement
>    that the issue is being withdrawn.  If none of the sponsors of any
>    of the proposals object within a week, the issue is withdrawn.
> 
>    The secretary may also include suggestions on how to proceed,
>    if appropriate.
> 
> ______________________________________________________________________
> 
> Replace A.6 with:
> 
>    A.6 Vote Counting
> 
>      1. Each voter's ballot ranks the options being voted on.  Not all
>         options need be ranked.  Ranked options are considered
>         preferred to all unranked options.  Voters may rank options
>         equally.  Unranked options are considered to be ranked equally
>         with one another.  Details of how ballots may be filled out
>         will be included in the Call For Votes.
>      2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other
>         than the default option which do not receive at least R votes
>         ranking that option above the default option are dropped from
>         consideration.
>      3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option
>         by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
>         a. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
>            who prefer option A over option B.
>         b. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
>            ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
>         c. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority ratio
>            is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
>      4. From the list of undropped options, we generate a list of
>         pairwise defeats.
>         a. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictly greater
>            than V(B,A).
>      5. From the list of [undropped] pairwise defeats, we generate a
>         set of transitive defeats.
>         a. An option A transitively defeats an option C if A defeats
>            C or if there is some other option B where A defeats B AND
>            B transitively defeats C.
>      6. We construct the Schwartz set from the set of transitive defeats.
>         a. An option A is in the Schwartz set if for all options B,
>            either A transitively defeats B, or B does not transitively
>            defeat A.
>      7. If there are defeats between options in the Schwartz set,
>         we drop the weakest such defeats from the list of pairwise
>         defeats, and return to step 5.
>         a. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if V(A,X)
>            is less than V(B,Y).  Also, (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y) if
>            V(A,X) is equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than V(Y,B).
>         b. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat weaker
>            than it.  There may be more than one such defeat.
>      8. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
>         is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set.  If there is
>         only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
>         options, the elector with the casting vote chooses which of those
>         options wins.  
> 
>      RATIONALE: Options which the voters rank above the default option
>      are options they find acceptable.  Options ranked below the default
>      options are options they find unacceptable.
> 
> ______________________________________________________________________
> 
> 
> Rationale:
> 
> If the Constitutional rules are strictly followed, then, by rule 3,
> all options that are dominated [pairwise beaten] by at least one other
> option are discarded, and references to them in the ballot papers will
> be ignored. That means that unless there's an "undominated"
> alternative ("option"), every alternative will be discarded and
> deleted from the ballots.
> 
> We've had a number of problems from ambiguities in our constitutional
> vote tallying procedure.  Changing the voting procedure would give us
> the same results on historical votes as the existing procedure, and
> would not suffer the ambiguities of the current procedure.
> 
> 	manoj
> 
> - -- 
> Confessions may be good for the soul, but they are bad for the
> reputation. Lord Thomas Dewar
> Manoj Srivastava   <srivasta@debian.org>  <http://www.debian.org/%7Esrivasta/>
> 1024R/C7261095 print CB D9 F4 12 68 07 E4 05  CC 2D 27 12 1D F5 E8 6E
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