Hi,
Summary of my point:
This election has demonstrated quite nicely that those Debian developers
who voted prefer Martin to any other single candidate. In other words, if
you held a vote which would ask whether to annul the vote and replace
Martin with Brandon, the majority would be against that proposal. I do not
understand how you can, given that fact, declare that Condorcet voting is
fundamentally flawed.
For the sake of argument, I am going to disregard the fact that changing
the rules retroactively when the result doesn't suit somebody just isn't
done in ANY democracy which deserves that title.
Craig Carey wrote:
> PS. Mr Voss suggests that Condorcet is good (which is false) and that
> Debian has ... a good method and incorrectly Mr Voss says that Condorcet
> is monotonic which is really untrue:
Replacing a statement by the opposite statement does not make any of them
more or less true.
I do not share your opinion that replacing IRV with its multiple-vote
equivalent would be an improvement in any way. On the contrary, you state
yourself that "Item [4] allows voters to mislead other voters." That is
one of the problems Condorcet is designed to avoid, because under
Condorcet, "strategic", i.e. insincere, voting just doesn't work.
> Anyway, I'd have plain Condorcet would fail the monotonicity
> check.
I don't understand that sentence. Please demonstrate how Condorcet would
fail the monotonicity criterion instead of just asserting it does, esp.
when electionmethods.org says it does not (and indeed any simple analysis
of Condorcet says the same). On the other hand, we have real-world data
which show how IRV does fail monotonicity, and frankly I don't see how
replacing a one-off IRV ballot with your iterated version would change
anything except incite even more people to vote insincerely.
Yor analysis completely disregards the fact that there CANNOT BE A 100%
FAIR ELECTION because the voters' opinion can be ambiguous. That has been
mathematically proven 200 years ago. All anybody can do is to invent a few
desireable properties and a few voting methods, decide which properties
are more important, and decide which voting method best fits that list.
Your analysis goes off on a tangent WRT "electing zero winners" and one- or
two-candidate elections. Neither is on-topic here.
The discussion about this already happened, a few months ago, and it
doesn't make much sense to repeat it.
--
Matthias Urlichs | noris network AG | http://smurf.noris.de/
--
If you want your program to be readable, consider supplying the argument.
-- Larry Wall in the perl man page
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