February 17th Voting GR draft
I did not see any changes proposed to the last draft posted,
so here is that version. We have been discussion this for several
months now (seems like a decade or so ;-); I suggest that unless
there are major and/or widespread objections, we treat this as a GR
proposal and move into a two week discussion period (of course, I
know that Murphy's law states that as soon as I say this, there shall
be a chorus if valid objections to this proposal -- this is Debian,
after all ;-)
Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
election], change item 3 to read:
3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes, tallies, and
results are not revealed during the voting period; after the
vote the Project Secretary lists all the votes cast. The voting
period is 2 weeks, but may be varied by up to 1 week by the
Project Leader, and may be ended by the Project Secretary when
the outcome is no longer in doubt. In this context, we ignore
the possibility that people might want to change their vote.
Under 5.2 Appointment of project leader, change item 7 to read:
7. The decision will be made using the method specified in section
A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure. The quorum is the
same as for a General Resolution (s.4.2) and the default
option is "None Of The Above".
Under 6.1 Powers [of the technical committee], change item 7 to read:
7. Appoint the Chairman of the Technical Committee. The Chairman
is elected by the Committee from its members. All members of
the committee are automatically nominated; the committee vote
starting one week before the post will become vacant (or
immediately, if it is already too late). The members may vote
by public acclamation for any fellow committee member,
including themselves; there is no default option. The vote
finishes when all the members have voted or when the outcome is
no longer in doubt. The result is determined using the method
specified in section A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.
Under A.2 Calling for a vote, change item 2 to read
2. The proposer or any sponsor of a resolution may call for a vote on that
resolution and all related amendments.
4. The minimum discussion period is counted from the time the last
formal amendment was accepted, or since the whole resolution
was proposed if no amendments have been proposed and accepted.
Replace A.3 with:
A.3. Voting procedure
1. Each resolution and its related amendments is voted on in a
single ballot, that includes an option for the original
resolution, each amendment, and the default option (where
2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
have a 1:1 majority requirement.
3. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6.
Unless otherwise specified, the default option is "Further
4. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
Replace A.5 with:
If a proposed resolution has not been discussed, amended, voted on or
otherwise dealt with for 4 weeks the secretary may issue a statement
that the issue is being withdrawn. If none of the sponsors of any
of the proposals object within a week, the issue is withdrawn.
The secretary may also include suggestions on how to proceed,
Replace A.6 with:
A.6 Vote Counting
1. Each voter's ballot ranks the options being voted on. Not all
options need be ranked. Ranked options are considered
preferred to all unranked options. Voters may rank options
equally. Unranked options are considered to be ranked equally
with one another. Details of how ballots may be filled out
will be included in the Call For Votes.
2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other
than the default option which do not receive at least R votes
ranking that option above the default option are dropped from
3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option
by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
a. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
who prefer option A over option B.
b. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
c. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, it's majority ratio
is S, otherwise it's majority ratio is 1.
4. We construct the Schwartz set based on undropped options and
a. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictly
greater than V(B,A).
b. An option A transitively defeats an option C if A
defeats C or if there is some other option B where A
defeats B AND B transitively defeats C.
c. An option A is in the Schwartz set if for all options B,
either A transitively defeats B, or B does not transitively
5. If there are defeats between options in the Schwartz set, we
drop the weakest such defeats, and return to step 4.
a. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if V(A,X)
is less than V(B,Y). Also, (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y)
if V(A,X) is equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than
b. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat
weaker than it. There may be more than one such defeat.
6. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is
only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
options, the elector with a casting vote chooses which of those
"RATIONALE": Options which the voters rank above the default option
are options they find acceptable. Options ranked below the default
options are options they find unacceptable.
A winner isn't nearly as afraid of losing as a loser is secretly
afraid of winning.
Manoj Srivastava <email@example.com> <http://www.debian.org/%7Esrivasta/>
1024R/C7261095 print CB D9 F4 12 68 07 E4 05 CC 2D 27 12 1D F5 E8 6E
1024D/BF24424C print 4966 F272 D093 B493 410B 924B 21BA DABB BF24 424C